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ABSTRACT 
This thesis proposes a new methodology to design an event-based warning system as an 
alternative to the conventional variable-based alarm system.  
 
This study initially explores the options for grouping process variables for alarm 
allocation. Several grouping methods are discussed and an event-based grouping 
procedure is detailed. Selection of the key variables for a group is performed considering 
the information that the variables contain to distinguish between an abnormal and a 
normal condition. The information theory is used to quantify the information content of a 
variable about an event to select the key variables. The cross-correlation analysis between 
pairs of key variables is used to identify the redundant variables. Simulation study using 
the model of a continuous stirred tank reactor (CSTR) is used to demonstrate the 
methodology.  
 
The proposed event-based early warning system utilizing online measurements is detailed 
in the thesis. In this approach, warnings are assigned to plant abnormal events instead of 
individual variables. To assess the likelihoods of undesirable events, the Bayesian 
Network is used; the event likelihoods are estimated in real time utilizing online 
measurements. Diagnostic analysis is conducted to identify root-causes of events. By 
assigning warning to events, the methodology results in significantly lower number of 
warnings compared to traditional variable-based warning (alarms) system. It also enables 
early warning of a possible event along with an efficient diagnosis of the root-causes of 
the event. Experimental testing using a level control system is presented to demonstrate 
the efficacy of the proposed method. Simulation study using the model of a CSTR is also 
presented to demonstrate the performance of the algorithm. Both, experimental and 
simulation studies, have shown promising results. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a brief introduction to process monitoring and warning systems in 
the process industry as well as the limitations of the standard variable-based alarm 
systems. The motivations and objectives of this research are also presented. 
1.1 Early warning systems in the process industry 
Process industries deal with hazardous materials, high intensive energy and complex 
equipment in day-to-day operations.  It is important to monitor the state of a process in 
real time to identify any vulnerable condition before it leads to a more severe event, 
which may be harmful in safety, economical, social and environmental aspects. Due to 
the high level of complexity of modern plants, process industries use process control 
systems such as the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system and the 
distributed control system (DCS) to monitor a large number of process variables and store 
vast amount of data during plant operations. In a complex process plant, the number of 
observed variables may be in thousands (Venkatasubramanian, Rengaswamy, & Yin, 
2003). Early warning systems are installed in the control rooms to monitor and detect 
deviation of variables from their normal operating range. The warning system 
communicates to the operator to take corrective actions required to maintain the operation 
under safe conditions. 
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Conventional warning systems are single variable-based where the warning provides 
information regarding the status of the respective variable; however, little or no 
information about the possible event or plant state is obtained. When the plant is in the 
initial phase of an abnormality, many secondary process variables may exceed their 
threshold limits. However, operators may not identify the possible key event until some 
primary variables exceed their threshold limit. The capability of early detection of 
abnormal situation is limited with conventional alarm systems. However, early detection 
of process abnormality is critical as some abnormality can quickly propagate to more 
severe and uncontrollable conditions. It is essential for operators to have enough time to 
analyze the situation to determine the root causes and to take corrective action to bring 
back the process state to normal operating conditions. 
 
Due to the ability to monitor large numbers of variables with low cost, plant 
designers/engineers tend to assign alarms to as many variables as they can. It simply costs 
less to add an alarm than to discuss whether it is needed or not. Hence, the number of 
alarms in process plants has dramatically increased over the last two decades. As a result, 
even a minor disturbance may trigger many low information secondary alarms and give 
the operator a false impression about the plant state. On the other hand, a major 
disturbance, which can propagate to a severe event, can trigger many redundant alarms 
along with a primary alarm. As a result, alarm rates regularly exceed the operators' 
physical ability to handle alarms. This phenomenon is called `alarm flooding' that can 
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reduce the motivation of the operators to check on alarms. It can also reduce the ability of 
the operator to detect the root-causes (Izadi, Shah, Shook, & Chen, 2009). According to 
the EEMUA, an operator should not handle more than six alarms per hour (EEMUA, 
2007). In reality, according to different reviews, numbers of alarms exceed this value by a 
wide margin during both normal and abnormal conditions (Rothenberg, 2009; Y. Chang, 
Khan, & Ahmed, 2011). Minimizing the number of alarms without compromising the 
ability to identify failures is a crucial factor in process alarm system design.  
 
Over the past few decades, numerous process related accidents took place during regular 
operations. One example is the BP Texas refinery explosion that killed 18 people and 
injured 180, and resulted in 1.5 billion dollars losses. One of the findings from the 
investigation of the accident is that the process monitoring system did not give adequate 
information and warning about the dangerous plant status timely (USCSB, 2007). The 
explosion at the Texaco Refinery Milford Haven is another example of process accident 
where alarm flooding contributed to the accident. With an upset situation, an alarm 
flooding condition occurred and 2 or 3 alarms per second were displayed in the control 
panel before the accident. Health and Safety Executive (HSE) reported that the accident 
could have been prevented if the operators were able to find the root-cause of the upset. 
Due to the accident 26 people were injured; damage and production losses amounted to £ 
48 million (HSE, 1994). 
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1.2 Motivation and Objectives 
Recent studies (Ahmed, Gabbar, Chang, & Khan, 2011; Bao, Khan, Iqbal, & Chang, 
2011; Y. Chang et al., 2011) have proposed the concept of an event-based alarm system 
that groups process variables according to abnormal process events and uses the risk of an 
event as the  annunciating agent of an alarm. In this approach, the probabilities and 
severities of the events are required to calculate the real time risk of the event.  However, 
how to select the group of key variables to be monitored to predict an event, how to 
define and estimate a single indicator to represent the current state of the process with 
respect to an associated event, how to define the alarm annunciation philosophy, and 
finally how to analyze the root-causes of an event are not outlined in the published 
literature. This thesis attempts to address these issues and develop necessary techniques to 
design an event-based early warning system for process industries.   
 
The possibilities of utilizing groups of variables to develop a warning system that can 
mitigate the limitation of the variable-based system are explored. Several grouping 
methods are discussed along with their advantages and disadvantages. Grouping of 
variables according to the possible abnormal event was found to be the most suitable for 
the purpose of warning system design. An event-based grouping procedure is proposed in 
this thesis.  
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The focus of the thesis is to design an event-based early warning system that is able to 
annunciate warnings based on the probability of abnormal events using real time process 
measurements.  The specific objectives are: 
• Explore the options for limiting the number of warning annunciation during an 
abnormal condition by allocating key process variables into event-based groups. 
• Use Bayesian Network to define the relationship between events and associated 
factors to update the probabilities at real time utilizing sensor measurements. 
• Design an event-based early warning system having significant early warning 
capability compared with the conventional variable-based alarm system.  
• Develop a methodology to identify root-causes of abnormal events using real time 
sensor measurements. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organized in 6 Chapters. The first chapter is a brief introduction to process 
monitoring and warning systems in the process industry and the limitations of the 
standard variable-based alarm systems. The motivations and objectives of this research 
are also presented. Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive overview of the literature. The 
review details the early warning methods that are currently used in the industry along 
with the advanced early warning methods proposed in the literature. Chapter 3 describes 
the variable grouping methods and details a methodology to allocate process variables to 
abnormal events using the information theory and cross correlation analysis. Chapter 4 
presents the methodology for early warning system design. In this chapter a detail study 
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of identification of events, related process variables, and root-causes, calculation of 
events probabilities, and root-cause analysis of events are presented. The methodology for 
development of a Bayesian Network model for the warning system is also detailed. In 
Chapter 5, an experimental application along with a simulation study, are used to 
demonstrate the methodology and evaluate its performance. Also, this chapter presents a 
detailed analysis of the proposed early warning system and discusses its unique features. 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by presenting the conclusions and recommendations and 
outlining the scopes for further improvement of this work. 
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2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A plant abnormal situation is defined as “a disturbance or a series of disturbances in a 
process that causes a plant operation to deviate from its normal operating state” 
(“Abnormal Situation Managment Consortium,” 2008). Abnormal situations can range 
from minor process disturbances to major process upset, which require the operators to 
intervene and perform corrective actions. It is estimated that abnormal conditions cost at 
least $20 billion annually in the USA only (Cochran & Bullemer, 1996). Therefore, 
abnormal situation management (ASM) is a critical task in the process industry. ASM can 
be defined as early detection of an abnormal event, root-cause diagnosis of the 
abnormality and taking corrective action to bring back the process to normal and safe 
operating state (Venkatasubramanian, Rengaswamy, & Yin, 2003).  For early detection 
and root-cause diagnosis of abnormal situations, process monitoring and warning system 
are extensively used in process industries. Warning system can be defined as “a system 
designed to direct the operator's attention towards significant aspects of the current plant 
status” (Bransby & Jenkinson, 1998). Some of the required characteristics of a warning 
system are relevant, unique, timely, prioritized, understandable, diagnostic, advisory, and 
focusing (EEMUA, 2007). The warning system is one of the most critical safety element 
in process industries and it is the 3rd layer of protection after the process design layer and 
the basic process control system (BPCS) layer (Crowl & Louvar, 2001).  
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Many types of alarms are used in the process industry such as variable based alarms, 
deviation alarms, rate of change alarms, and calculated alarms (EEMUA, 2007). 
However, common warning systems are based on monitoring of individual variables to 
check whether a variable value is exceeding its threshold limit. Input to the warning 
system is usually a measurement of a process variable from a sensor (Izadi, Shah, Shook, 
et al., 2009). However conventional variable-based warning systems have many 
limitations that arise mostly due to their single variable setting. 
 
With the introduction of distributed control system, almost all the variables can be 
monitored. As a result, process-monitoring systems have large number of alarms, many of 
which are poorly designed. Due to the high number of warning variables, the number of 
nuisance alarms has increased significantly. Hence, even during a minor abnormality, 
alarm flooding may occur (Izadi, Shah, Shook, et al., 2009).  
 
Many alarm management techniques have been proposed in the literature to prevent alarm 
flooding. EEMUA 191 is a key guide for design, management and procurement of alarm 
systems. Alarm management techniques such as grouping alarms, alarm suppression, and 
shelving have been discussed in the EEMUA guideline (EEMUA, 2007). Alarm 
management life cycle approach has been proposed in the ISA standard to manage alarms 
at the design stage as well as during operation. It consists of the following stages: 
philosophy, identification, rationalization, design, implementation, operation, monitoring, 
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maintenance, and change activity. An effective tool that can be used to reduce number of 
redundant alarms is alarm rationalization (ISA, 2009).  
 
Alarm rationalization methods, that can identify redundant or unwanted alarms, have 
been proposed by many researchers to reduce the number of alarms in plant operations. 
Kondaveeti et al. (Kondaveeti, Izadi, Shah, & Black, 2009) proposed visualization tools 
using the High Density Alarm Plot (HDAP) and the Alarm Similarity Color Map 
(ASCM) to identify the nuisance alarms and thus to improve the performance of alarm 
systems. Noda at al. (Noda, Higuchi, Takai, & Nishitani, 2011) proposed an event 
correlation analysis to detect the  statistical similarities among alarms and operation 
alerts. In this approach, correlated alarms are grouped together according to the similarity 
to reduce alarms. Fuzzy clustering methodology has been proposed to identify similar 
alarms (Qunxiong & Zhiqiang, 2005). 
 
Proper alarm designing techniques such as threshold designing, multivariate process 
monitoring, and data processing can be used to reduce false and missed alarms (Izadi, 
Shah, Shook, et al., 2009; Izadi, Shah, & Shook, 2009). However, these techniques are 
yet to find widespread industrial application. 
 
As an alternate to the variable-based alarm system, Bao et al. (Bao et al., 2011) proposed 
a risk based alarm design method. Risk is a function of the probability of occurrence of an 
10 
 
 
accident, and its consequences. According to the risk based alarm methodology, warnings 
are considered as the faulty state of the primary process variables. The probability and the 
severity of a fault are calculated using the deviations of process variables from 
corresponding normal operation.  The risk-based alarms are triggered if the respective 
risk level exceeds the threshold level. If there are more than one high-risk process 
variable, alarms are prioritized according to the risk level. However, the proposed method 
(Bao et al., 2011) uses univariate analysis and its early warning capability is limited. 
Recent studies (Ahmed et al., 2011; Bao et al., 2011; Y. Chang et al., 2011) extended 
risk-based alarm design by proposing an event-based alarm system that groups process 
variables according to the events and use risk as the final indicator of the alarm. An event 
is defined as an undesirable condition that initiates as process deviates from its steady 
state. In the risk-based approach, the probabilities and severities of the events are required 
to calculate the real time risk of the event. However, the above-mentioned literature does 
not define how to calculate the probabilities and severity using the measurements of a 
group of variables. 
 
Many advanced multivariate fault detection methods have been proposed in the literature 
to utilize the process measurements for the purpose of early fault detection and diagnosis. 
These methods are classified as qualitative model based, quantitative model based, and 
historical data based. Fault detection and diagnosis methods have been reviewed in the 
literature (Venkatasubramanian, Rengaswamy, & Kavuri, 2003a, 2003b; 
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Venkatasubramanian, Rengaswamy, & Yin, 2003).  In the quantitative model based 
approach, the state of the actual process is observed and compared with an estimated state 
from a first principle model to determine abnormalities. The Kalman filter is frequently 
used to correct the measurement and process error to estimate the state of the process 
(Villez, Srinivasan, Rengaswamy, Narasimhan, & Venkatasubramanian, 2011). Use of 
dynamic models to predict process variables and their violation of emergency limit in 
future time steps by estimating unknown disturbances using the Kalman filter, has been 
discussed by Juricek et al. (Juricek, Seborg, & Larimore, 2001).  Frameworks to integrate 
fault detection and diagnosis with risk based monitoring systems have also been 
suggested in the literature. Zadakbar et al. (O Zadakbar, Imtiaz, & Khan, 2013) proposed 
a model-based method to calculate the multivariate residual error between plant model 
and actual plant data using the Kalman filter to detect faulty condition in the process. 
Residuals generated form the Kalman filter is used to calculate the real time risk in the 
process. However, development of a comprehensive process model for a complex process 
plant is a challenging task. Qualitative model based methods for fault detection have been 
proposed in the literature using causal model such as the digraph, and the fault tree (Ram 
Maurya, Rengaswamy, & Venkatasubramanian, 2004). However, the qualitative methods 
have limited capability to detect faults in real time. Many researchers have suggested 
historical data based methods for fault detection and diagnosis applications as an 
alternative to the first principles approach. Data mining and knowledge discovery using 
unsupervised statistical multivariate techniques such as the Principle Component Analysis 
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(PCA) and the Partial Least Square (PLS) and supervised learning method such as the 
Neural Network have been detailed in Wang et al. (X.Z. Wang, 1999). Zadakbar et al. 
(Omid Zadakbar, Imtiaz, & Khan, 2012) proposed PCA to convert high dimensional 
monitoring variable sets to low dimensional variable sets according to their correlation to 
detect process abnormality and calculate the process risk in real time. Contribution plots 
from the PCA are used for fault diagnosis. However, a large set of historical data is 
required to develop a statistical model.  
 
Recently, the Bayesian Network (BN), which is a probabilistic graphical method, has 
been used in many applications and it has shown promising results. BN is able to 
integrate expert subjective knowledge with plant data to do probabilistic prediction and 
diagnostic inference (Oniésko, Lucas, & Druzdzel, 2001). Khakzad et al. (Khakzad, 
Khan, & Amyotte, 2011) proposed a BN based methodology for safety analysis in 
process industry which was further extended to perform dynamic safety analysis 
(Khakzad, Khan, & Amyotte, 2012). The ‘Pathfinder project’ (Heckerman, Horvitz, & 
Nathwani, 1992) that used BN expert system to diagnose medical conditions of patients 
has reported successful use of BN in performing critical analysis in many complex 
situations. BN has also been used for many real time safety related accident prediction 
applications. Real time traffic accident prediction on urban expressway using traffic data 
has been proposed by (Hossain & Muromachi, 2012) and Argiolas et al. (Argiolas, 
Carbonari, Melis, & Quaquero, 2012) used BN to predict the accident in a construction 
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site using site information. Early fault detection of a boiler using BN by utilizing real time 
process deviation data has also been reported (Widarsson & Dotzauer, 2008). Real time 
fire detection model using sensor measurements to predict fire is proposed by Jing et al. 
(Jing & Jingqi, 2012). Using uncertain real time sensor data, BN model was capable to 
detect the fire at the initial stage according to the fire symptoms. Many natural disaster 
early warning system that rely on uncertain data have used BN to model the situation and 
early warn the disaster (Blaser, Ohrnberger, Riggelsen, Babeyko, & Scherbaum, 2011; 
Zazzaro, Pisano, & Romano, 2012). BN is a powerful tool to do fault diagnosis due to its 
ability to do inference under uncertainty. Cause and effect relationship of the online 
process information is used to conduct root-cause analysis (Alaeddini & Dogan, 2011; 
Dey & Stori, 2005; Pradhan, Singh, Kachru, & Narasimhamurthy, 2007). The above 
literature demonstrates the potential use of BN as a tool to develop real time early 
warning systems. 
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3  VARIABLE ALLOCATION FOR EVENT-BASED GROUPS 
3.1 Introduction 
The ability to monitor large number of variables and the ability to assign alarms to each 
variable led to a substantial increase in the numbers of alarms in industrial plants. This, in 
turn, increased the numbers of false and redundant alarms. In plant operations, the 
numbers of annunciated alarms regularly exceed the acceptable rates that operators can 
handle. This chapter explores the options for grouping variables for alarm allocation. 
Several grouping methods are discussed and an event-based grouping procedure is 
detailed. Selection of the key variables for a group is performed using the information 
that the variables can have to distinguish between an abnormal and a normal condition. 
The concept of mutual information is used to quantify the information. Variables with 
high information gain are grouped together for each respective abnormal event. To 
identify the redundant variables within the groups to further reduce the number of 
variables to be monitored, the maximum cross-correlation between pairs of key variables 
are used. A case study using the example of a continuous stirred tank reactor is used to 
demonstrate the methodology. 
3.2 Grouping methods 
This section addresses the concept of grouping of variables to assign alarms. Allocation 
of an alarm to a group of variables will result in the annunciation of one alarm when one 
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or more variables within the group deviate. Grouping can be performed considering 
various factors. Variables can be grouped according to their types, or the equipment that 
they are associated with, or according to their correlations. Variables can also be grouped 
according to the events they are associated with. 
3.2.1 Grouping based on variable types 
Different types of measurements such as temperatures, pressures and levels are available 
from industrial plants. By grouping variables according to their types and assigning 
alarms to groups may significantly reduce the number of alarms in a plant. For example, 
if there are number of thermo-couples along the length of a distillation column, instead of 
assigning alarms to each of the measurements, one alarm can be allocated to the set of 
temperature measurements. Annunciation of the alarm would indicate an abnormality 
related to the temperature in the column. Thus, in a particular system, which has a high 
number of monitored variables of the same type, the operator can efficiently identify a 
faulty situation without causing alarm flooding. However the operator will need more 
information to identify the root-causes of any failure.  
3.2.2 Grouping by plant unit or equipment 
In a complex process plant monitoring system, variables can be grouped unit- or 
equipment-wise. For example, measurements from the stripping section of a distillation 
column can be grouped together to assign an alarm whose annunciation would direct the 
operator to focus on that section and take actions. Thus the operator can effectively 
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identify the failure location and further analyze the situation to find the root-cause 
without having many alarms from the same unit or system. But due to correlation of plant 
variables, one unit failure can be affected by other upstream variables and this can 
mislead the operators.  
3.2.3 Grouping based on correlations  
Strong correlations exist among plant variables due to their interactions and also due to 
plant connectivity. For example, the composition of the feed to a reactor may affect the 
conversion in the reactor leading to a changed product composition, product flow rate 
and/or the temperature in the reactor. If alarms are assigned to each of the variables, a 
change in the feed may cause a number of alarms to annunciate. Thus one failure may 
lead to many alarms. If variables are grouped according to their correlations, number of 
redundant alarms can be significantly reduced. However, the information from the alarm 
will be unclear. Also prioritizing of alarms can be difficult for the operator.  
 
3.2.4 Grouping based on abnormal events 
Variables related to an abnormal event may be grouped together to assign an alarm. For 
example, for a simple tank process, the flow rates of the inlet and the outlet streams along 
with the level of liquid in the tank may be related to an overflow condition of the tank. 
However, instead of assigning alarms to each of the variables, an overflow alarm can be 
defined based on the above measurements. Thus number of alarms can be reduced. In 
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addition, the annunciation of the alarm would inform the operator about a defined event. 
Considering these advantages, the event-based grouping method was preferred over the 
other methods. Following section will demonstrate how to select process variables for 
event-based groups. 
3.3 Variable selection methods 
Identification of the key variables related to an abnormal event is a challenging task. The 
most important variables can be identified by various data-based techniques, or based on 
expert knowledge. Expert knowledge can be integrated with process risk assessment 
methods to identify variables that influence an abnormal event. However, if the process 
plant is large and complex or if there is not sufficient expert knowledge on the process, 
data based variable selection methods are more efficient. Z.Yang et al. (Z. Yang, Wang, 
& Chen, 2012) proposed a variable selection method based on the principle component 
analysis (PCA) and the resulting contribution plot to detect important variables to classify 
fault conditions. The concept of entropy from the information theory has been used to 
estimate the most informative variable related to a failure for the purpose of selecting 
sensor locations (Orantes, Kempowsky, Le Lann, & Aguilar-Martin, 2008). Mutual 
information concept for key variables selection by using information theory for Gaussian 
random variables is used for grouping variables to assign alarms by Pérez et al. (Pérez, 
Larrañaga, & Inza, 2006).  
 
18 
 
 
Based on variables information content, variables can be grouped together to represent 
different abnormal events. However, there can be highly correlated variables within a 
group. In order to identify the redundant variable within a group, correlation analysis can 
be performed. Various methods have been proposed in the literature to cluster process 
variables or alarms according to their correlation. Noda et al. and Yang et al. (Noda et al., 
2011; Z. Yang et al., 2012) proposed methods to analyze correlated alarms by using 
binary alarm data. Geng et al. (Geng, Zhu, & Gu, 2005) proposed a method to cluster 
variables by fuzzy clustering method. Independent grouping analysis is proposed by 
Alhoniemi et al. (Alhoniemi et al., 2007) considering mutually dependent variables using 
a cost function. Information redundancy between variables using the concept of mutual 
information has been discussed in (Yu & Liu, 2003). The maximum cross-correlation 
among variables has also been used to identify the redundant variables (Swift, Tucker, 
Martin, & Liu, 2001).  
 
In this study, selection of the key variables for a group is performed using the information 
that the variables can distinguish between an abnormal and a normal condition. The 
concept of mutual information is used to quantify the information. Variables with high 
information gain are grouped together for the respective abnormal event. To identify the 
redundant variables within a group to further reduce the number of variables to be 
monitored, the maximum cross-correlation between pairs of key variables are used. The 
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following sections present the detailed methodology to allocate variables into event-based 
groups. 
3.4 Methodology for allocating process variables to event-based groups 
The proposed methodology for selecting process variables for abnormal event groups is 
presented in Figure 3-1. The initiating step is identification of abnormal event and 
corresponding failures (root causes) to generate process data or acquire historical data 
from the particular unit or process. Two subsequent steps to be followed: (i) to select the 
variable group with high information content about the event and (ii) identify redundant 
variables within the selected group. Mutual information between events and variables is 
used to calculate the information gain to identify the process variables that have high 
information gain for each abnormal event. Afterwards, cross correlation analysis between 
pairs of process variables for each abnormal event data set is used to identify redundant 
variables within each event group. Finally, using process knowledge and the grouping 
results, process variables are allocated for each abnormal event group. 
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Figure 3-1: Methodology of allocation of variable for abnormal event groups 
3.4.1 Process data generation 
In order to select variables to form a group, the first step is to identify the abnormal 
events and root causes (failures) that can occur in the unit, equipment or a system. This is 
done by Hazard and Operability Study  (HAZOP) (Crowl & Louvar, 2001). Information 
of the HAZOP study can also be used to select variables for each abnormal event. 
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However, if the plant is complex or processes are integrated, data based methodology can 
be used to get efficient results. Once the failures and the abnormal events are identified, 
process data are required to group variables. If the plant is at the design stage, simulation 
can be carried out to generate data for the abnormal events. For an operational plant, 
historical data can be used along with simulations to meet data requirements. Using data 
for both normal operations and for abnormal events, the information theory is used to 
select the key variables associated with an event. 
3.4.2 Grouping variables according to information gain 
3.4.2.1 The Information Theory 
The information theory, proposed by Shannon (Shannon, 1948), which is routinely used 
in communication systems, measures the information content of a random variable in a 
quantitative manner. According to the theory, uncertainty associated with a random 
discrete variable X can be measured by its entropy 𝐻(𝑋) using equation 3-1 𝐻 𝑋 = − 𝑃 𝑥 𝑙𝑜𝑔!(𝑃(𝑥))!  ( 3-1  ) 
 
Here, 𝑋 is assumed to be a discrete random variable. 𝑃(𝑥) is the probability mass density 
function of 𝑋   =   𝑥 occurrence. Entropy is measured in unit `bits', therefore log! is 
considered in the calculations.  
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For example, a fair coin toss, with 𝑃(𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒) = 0.5 and 𝑃(𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒) = 0.5 
have 1 bit of entropy. If the coin is not fair and the probability of getting a tails is 𝑝, then 
the probability of getting a head is 1− 𝑝. Following equation 3-1 the entropy of tossing a 
coin can be obtained as 𝐻 𝑝 = −𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑔! 𝑝 − 1− 𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑔!(1− 𝑝) 
The function 𝐻(𝑝) is plotted in Figure 3-2 to illustrate the basic characteristic of entropy. 
Entropy will maximize if the uncertainty of the random variable is maximum. In the 
above case, a fair coin represents maximum uncertainty 𝑃 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 𝑇 = 0.5  and 
results in the maximum entropy. Entropy will be minimum when the uncertainty is 
minimum.  A biased coin that always get either head or tail 𝑃 𝐻𝑒a𝑑 = 𝑇 = 0  or  1   has 
zero entropy.  
 
Figure 3-2: Entropy of tossing a coin.  
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For 2 discrete random variables 𝑋 and 𝑌, the joint entropy 𝐻(𝑋;   𝑌)  can be defined as, 𝐻(𝑋;   𝑌  )   = 𝑃 𝑥,𝑦 𝑙𝑜𝑔!(𝑃(𝑥,𝑦))!,!    ( 3-2 ) 𝑃(𝑥,𝑦) is the discrete joint probability distribution of 𝑋   =   𝑥 and 𝑌   =   𝑦.  
 
Conditional entropy between discrete random variables 𝑋 and 𝑌 with joint probability 
distribution 𝑃(𝑥,𝑦) and conditional distribution 𝑃(𝑥|𝑦) is defined by, 𝐻(𝑋|  𝑌  )   = 𝑃 𝑥,𝑦 𝑙𝑜𝑔!(𝑃(𝑥|𝑦))!,!    ( 3-3 ) 
3.4.2.2 Mutual Information 
The mutual information which one random variable contains about another random 
variable can be derived as outlined in (Cover & Thomas, 1991). 
𝐼 𝑋;   𝑌   = 𝑃 𝑥,𝑦 𝑙𝑜g! 𝑝 𝑥,𝑦𝑃 𝑥 𝑃 𝑦!,!    ( 3-4 ) 𝐼(𝑋;   𝑌  ) is the mutual information between random variables 𝑋 and 𝑌. Equation 3-4 can 
be simplified as follows 
𝐼 𝑋;   𝑌   =   𝐻 𝑋 −   𝐻(𝑋|𝑌  )   ( 3-5 ) 
𝐻(𝑋|𝑌  ) is the entropy of the random variable 𝑋 given 𝑌. If 𝐻(𝑋|𝑌) is same as 𝐻(𝑋), 
then it is considered that the variable 𝑌 does not have any information about the variable 𝑋. However, if 𝐻(𝑋|𝑌) is lower than 𝐻(𝑋), it is considered that the variable 𝑌 does have 
some information about the variable 𝑋. That is uncertainty about 𝑋 has reduced if 
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information about variable 𝑌 is known. Hence, that reduction of uncertainty is defined as 
the mutual information gain of the variables 𝑋 and 𝑌.  
3.4.2.3 Selection of variables using mutual information 
The mutual information between two random variables can be used to select the key 
variables that contain significant information regarding an event. In order to do that, 
variable 𝑌 needs to be defined as a random variable that indicates the failures that can 
propagate to a specific abnormal event. For an example, if there is only one failure that 
can propagate to an abnormal condition then Y can be defined by two random numbers, 𝑌   =   0 (normal) and 𝑌   =   1 (failure). On the other hand if there are 𝑘 − 1 number of 
failures that can propagate to a specific abnormal event, then 𝑌 can have 𝑘 random 
numbers (𝑘 being the number of failures plus the normal condition). If the variable does 
not have the ability to distinguish an abnormal event from the normal condition, then the 
amount of uncertainty do not change. If a variable can distinguish between conditions, 
then the amount of uncertainty will be reduced. Reduction of the uncertainty or entropy is 
the information gain that a variable contains. The following equation presents the 
information gain between a continuous random variable 𝑋 and a discrete random variable 𝑌 that have 𝑘 values. 
𝐼 𝑋;   𝑌   = .!!!! 𝑃 𝑦, 𝑥 𝑙𝑜𝑔! 𝑝 𝑦, 𝑥𝑃 𝑦 𝑝 𝑥 d𝑥!    ( 3-6 ) 
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Entropy of a continuous random variable having a normal distribution has been defined 
in (Cover & Thomas, 1991) as, 
𝐻(𝑋)   =    𝑝 𝑥 𝑙𝑜𝑔!(𝑝 𝑥 )𝑑𝑥!   = 12 𝑙𝑜𝑔!(2𝜋𝑒𝜎!)   ( 3-7 ) 𝑝(𝑥) is the probability distribution of a continuous random variable 𝑋 and 𝜎  is the 
standard deviation of 𝑋. Pérez et al (Pérez et al., 2006) proved that if the variable 𝑋 has a 
normal distribution and if 𝐶 is a multinomial random variable having 1 to 𝑘 finite 
outcome with a probability distribution of 𝑃(𝐶   =   𝑐), and 𝑝(𝑐, 𝑥) is the joint probability 
distribution of 𝐶   =   𝑐 and 𝑋   =   𝑥, then the information that the variable can have for all 
the 𝐶 values is given by, 
𝐼(𝑋;𝐶)   =    𝑃 𝑐, 𝑥 𝑙𝑜𝑔! 𝑝 𝑐,𝑦𝑃 𝑐 𝑃 𝑦! 𝑑𝑥!!!!    ( 3-8 ) 𝐼(𝑋;𝐶) is the mutual information between 𝑋 and 𝐶. During normal conditions, variations 
of data occur only due to measurement noise, which is typically white noise with small 
magnitude. But if the variable contains high information, then for each failure condition 
the variation in data will be significant. Therefore entropy between failures and the 
variable will decrease. Information gain for a continuous random variable 𝑋 having a 
Gaussian distribution and a multinomial variable C is derived in Pérez et al (Pérez et al., 
2006) as follows, 
𝐼 𝑋;   𝐶   = .!!!! 𝑃 𝑐, 𝑥 𝑙𝑜g! 𝑝 𝑐, 𝑥𝑃 𝑐 𝑝 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥 = .
!!
!! 𝑃 𝑐 𝑝(𝑥|𝑐) 𝑙𝑜𝑔! 𝑝 𝑥|𝑐𝑝 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥  
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𝐼 𝑋;   𝐶   = 𝑃 𝑐!!!! 𝑝(𝑥|𝑐) 𝑙𝑜𝑔! 𝑝(𝑥|𝑐)! 𝑑𝑥 − .
!!
!! 𝑃 𝑐 𝑝(𝑥|𝑐) 𝑙𝑜g! 𝑝(𝑥)! 𝑑𝑥 
The second integral can be expressed as,  
.!!!! 𝑃 𝑐 𝑝(𝑥|𝑐) 𝑙𝑜𝑔! 𝑝(𝑥)! 𝑑𝑥 =    𝑝(𝑥, 𝑐) 𝑙𝑜𝑔! 𝑝(𝑥)
!!
!!! 𝑑𝑥 
.!!!! 𝑃 𝑐 𝑝(𝑥|𝑐) 𝑙𝑜𝑔! 𝑝(𝑥)! 𝑑𝑥 =    𝑝(𝑥) 𝑙𝑜𝑔! 𝑝(𝑥)! 𝑑𝑥 =   − 12 𝑙𝑜𝑔!(2𝜋𝑒𝜎!)   
and then, 
𝐼 𝑋;   𝐶   = 𝑃 𝑐!!!! − 12 𝑙𝑜𝑔!(2𝜋𝑒𝜎!)   + 12 𝑙𝑜𝑔!(2𝜋𝑒𝜎!)    
𝐼 𝑋;   𝐶   = − 12 𝑙𝑜𝑔! 2𝜋𝑒 − 12 𝑃 𝑐!!!! 𝑙𝑜𝑔! 𝜎!! + 12 𝑙𝑜𝑔! 2𝜋𝑒 + 12 𝑙𝑜𝑔!(𝜎!)    
𝐼(𝑋;𝐶)   =   12 𝑙𝑜𝑔! 𝜎! − 𝑃 𝑐!!!! 𝑙𝑜𝑔!(𝜎!!)  ( 3-9 ) 
 
Equation 3-9 is used to calculate the information gain. Where 𝜎 is the standard deviation 
of the random variable 𝑋 and 𝜎! is the standard deviation of the random variable 𝑋 given 𝐶   =   𝑐. 𝑃(𝐶) is assumed to have uniform distribution, implying that the information 
about the normal and the failure conditions are unknown and their probability of 
occurrence are the same. It is also assumed that the data acquired for each variable in 
different conditions are normally distributed and 𝐶 is considered as multinomial random 
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variable. Finally variables having high 𝐼 values are selected as the most suitable variables 
to monitor the respective event.   
3.4.3 Identification of the redundant variables 
Variables that are selected for each event group may contain the same information and 
thus they can be considered to be redundant. The redundant variables are identified using 
the correlation analysis. The purpose is to identify redundant variables within a group and 
thus to exclude all but one from a redundant set for monitoring. To perform the 
correlation analysis, data are standardized to have zero means. The cross-correlation 
between pairs of variables are estimated. There can be time lags between variables. 
Hence, to calculate the maximum correlation, time lag is varied and the correlations are 
calculated to get the maximum positive or maximum negative value. Maximum time lag 
can be decided using process knowledge (Swift et al., 2001). Pearson correlation 
coefficient is used to calculate the similarity between x and y continuous process 
variables as follows (F. Yang, Sirish, & Xiao, 2010) 
𝜙!,!(𝑙𝑎𝑔) = 𝐸 (𝑥! − 𝜇!)(𝑦!!!"# − 𝜇!)𝜎!𝜎!    ( 3-10 ) 
𝜙!,! 𝑙𝑎𝑔 = 1𝑛 − 𝑙𝑎𝑔 𝑥! − 𝜇! 𝑦!!!"# − 𝜇!𝜎!𝜎!!!!"#!!!     𝑙𝑎𝑔   ≥ 0   ( 3-11 ) 
𝜙!,! 𝑙𝑎𝑔 = 1𝑛 − 𝑙𝑎𝑔 𝑥! − 𝜇! 𝑦!!!"# − 𝜇!𝜎!𝜎!!!!!!!"#   𝑙𝑎𝑔 < 0   ( 3-12 ) 
 
28 
 
 
𝜎!  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜎!  are the standard deviations of x and y, and 𝜇!  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜇!  are their mean values. 𝑙𝑎𝑔 is the time lag of 𝑦 with respect to 𝑥. At the maximum positive correlation 
coefficient 𝜙!"!, time lag is 𝑙𝑎𝑔!"# and at maximum negative correlation coefficient 𝜙!"#, time lag is 𝑙𝑎𝑔!"#. Then the maximum absolute correlation coefficient is 
calculated as follows (F. Yang et al., 2010),  𝜙!"#  𝑖𝑠  𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑛  𝑎𝑡  𝑙𝑎𝑔!"#  𝑖𝑓  𝜙!!" ≥   −𝜙!"#  −𝜙!"#  𝑖𝑠  𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑛  𝑎𝑡  𝑙𝑎𝑔!"#  𝑖𝑓  –𝜙!"#   ≥   𝜙!"# 
The correlation matrix is thus developed. Variables that are highly correlated with each 
other are grouped together. For the purpose of better visual representation, grouping is 
done by calculating the similarity distance between each pair of variables. After getting 
the distance between variables in the data, variables close to each other can be linked and 
presented in clusters in a hierarchical tree dendrogram (Martinez, Martinez, & Solka, 
2004). 
3.4.4 Allocating variables for abnormal event group 
Finally after calculating the information that process variables have regarding the event 
and the redundant variable within the group, variable allocation is carried out. Expert 
knowledge is also used to justify the choice of variables within a redundant group. 
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3.5 Application of the variable allocating methodology 
Figure 3-3: CSTR process diagram 
To demonstrate the methodology and its applicability, a jacketed continuous stirred tank 
reactor (CSTR) is considered. An irreversible exothermic reaction 𝐴   →   𝐵  is assumed to 
take place in the reactor with a first order kinetics. A temperature controller is used to 
control the reactor temperature by manipulating the coolant flow rate. The level of liquid 
in the reactor is also maintained by manipulating the reactor outlet flow. Heat losses are 
considered negligible and a perfect mixing condition is assumed. All the parameters for 
the model are taken from literature (Luyben, 1996) and the controller parameters are 
taken from Chang et al. (C. Chang & Yu, 1990). Simulation model used due to the 
unavailability of real process operation data. This study is further extended to develop an 
early waning system and the same CSTR operation is used through the study due to the 
convenient. To demonstrate the methodology, Simulink is used to build a plant model.  
Detail model is presented in the appendix.  Different failure conditions are simulated with 
30 
 
 
Simulink to generate data. For the CSTR, 11 variables are identified as measurement 
variables as presented in Table 3-1.  
Table 3-1: List of variables that are measured in the CSTR process 
No	   	  Measured	  variable	  
1	   Reactor	  liquid	  level	  
2	   Coolant	  utility	  outlet	  temperature	  
3	   Reactant	  concentration	  
4	   Reactor	  vessel	  temperature	  
5	   Reactor	  output	  flow	  rate	  
6	   Coolant	  utility	  flow	  rate	  
7	   Reactant	  feed	  temperature	  
8	   Reactant	  feed	  flow	  rate	  
9	   Coolant	  inlet	  temperature	  
10	   Level	  controller	  output	  
11	   Temperature	  controller	  output	  
 
Variables 5 and 6 are manipulated to control variables 1 and 4, respectively. Other 
variables are uncontrolled variables. Ten failures are considered for this study. Using 
Simulink, data for all the failures and the normal condition are generated. Table 3-2 
presents the failures. 
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Table 3-2: Possible failure conditions for the CSTR process 
No	  Failure	   Failures	  (Root-­‐causes)	  
F1	   Reactant	  feed	  flow	  disturbance	  -­‐	  High	  flow	  
F2	   Reactant	  feed	  flow	  disturbance-­‐	  Low	  Flow	  
F3	   Coolant	  system	  failure	  -­‐	  High	  coolant	  temperature	  
F4	   Coolant	  system	  failure	  -­‐	  Low	  coolant	  temperature	  
F5	   Reactor	  out	  flow	  valve	  failure-­‐	  High	  flow	  
F6	   Reactor	  out	  flow	  valve	  failure-­‐	  Low	  flow	  
F7	   Coolant	  flow	  valve	  failure	  -­‐	  High	  flow	  
F8	   Coolant	  flow	  valve	  failure	  -­‐	  Low	  flow	  
F9	   Reactant	  feed	  quality	  failure	  -­‐	  High	  concentration	  
F10	   Reactant	  feed	  quality	  failure	  -­‐	  Low	  concentration	  
 
Some of these failures can propagate to more severe abnormal events. Table 3-3 presents 
the abnormal events and the respective failures (root-causes) that can lead to the events. 
Table 3-3: Possible abnormal events for the CSTR process 
Abnormal	  Event	  	   Failure	  	  
(Root-­‐causes)	  
Runaway	  	   F3,	  F8	  
Flooding	  	   F1,	  F6	  
Low	  quality	  products	  	   F9,	  F4,	  F7	  
32 
 
 
3.5.1 Grouping variables 
Data were gathered from simulating the failure conditions. For each variable, information 
gain was calculated by using equation 3-9. Information gains for failures are calculated 
considering failure and normal condition data variation. For abnormal event all the related 
failures and normal condition data are used to calculate the information gain according to 
the equation 3-9.   
 
Then variables are grouped according to their information gain. First a pairwise 
comparison for the normal and a failure is carried out to identify variables that can reduce 
the uncertainty of the failure under consideration.  
 
Figure 3-4: Information gain of different variable corresponding to failure F8: coolant valve failure - 
low coolant flow  
33 
 
 
As observed from Figure 3-4, there are 5 main variables 4, 2, 11, 3 and 6 having 
significant information about the coolant valve failure. Accordingly, these sets of five 
variables are considered as the key variables for the failure F8. Following the same 
procedure, key variables are identified for all the failures. 
 
In order to group variables according to the abnormal events, information gains are 
calculated by considering all the failures that can propagate to the corresponding 
abnormal event. Figure 3-5 presents the mutual information gain for all of the listed 
variables for the abnormal event, runaway reaction. 
 
Figure 3-5: Information gain of different variable for the event- runaway reaction 
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As shown in Figure 3-5, the variables 4, 2, 11, 6, 3 and 9 can give significant information 
about the runaway event. Accordingly, these set of six variables are considered as the key 
variables for the event runaway reaction. Following the same procedure, key variables are 
identified for all the events. 
3.5.2 Redundant variable selection 
Cross correlation analyses are carried out to identify the redundant variables within a 
group of key variables, which are selected for each event. The maximum cross correlation 
matrix is generated by varying the time lag between each pair of variables for each 
abnormal condition data. For the purpose of visualization, a hierarchical cluster tree is 
developed in the form of a dendrogram as presented in Figure 3-6 that shows the 
correlations among variables related to the runaway event. Finally it is required to choose 
one variable from each redundant group for the purpose of minimizing the monitored 
variables.  
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Figure 3-6: Correlation among variables for the runaway event 
3.5.3 Allocating variables to groups 
Choosing the most suitable variable from a redundant set may become a challenging task. 
Process knowledge as well as sensor characteristics may be required to consider for this 
purpose. In this case the variable with the highest information gain among the redundant 
variables is chosen. Table 3-4 presents the list of variables that can be allocated to the 
groups corresponding to the individual events and the highly correlated variables within 
different groups. It also shows the final group selection for each of the events. 
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Table 3-4: Selected variable groups for different abnormal events  
Event	   Key	  
variables	  
Redundant	  
variable	  
Chosen	  
groups	  
Runaway	  	   (2,3,4,6,9,11)	  	   (2,3,4)	  &	  (6,9)	  	   (2,6,11)	  
Flooding	  	   (1,3,5,8,10)	  	   (3,5,8)	  	   (1,8,10)	  
Low	  Quality	  	   (2,3,4,11)	  	   (2,4)	  	   (3,4,11)	  
 
3.6 Discussion 
From the results, reactor vessel temperature (variable 2), coolant utility flow rate (variable 
6) and temperature controller output (variable 11) are the main variables that have most 
information regarding runaway reaction. It is obvious that the reactor temperature is the 
main variables that can be used to detect a runaway. Main root cause for the runaway 
reaction is the failure of the coolant system. Variable 6 and 11 are directly related to the 
coolant system failures.  
 
Primary variable for flooding condition monitoring is level of the reactor (Variable 1). 
Therefore it should be a key variable. The main root causes are the level controller failure 
and feed flow valve failure. Variables which are directly related to both failures and 
identified as the key variables are the reactant feed flow rate (variable 8) and the level 
controller output (variable 10).  
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Low quality production can be quantified by reactant concentration (variable 3), which is 
a key variable according to the methodology. Incomplete reaction due to the low 
temperature is the main reason for low quality production. The Proposed methodology 
has identified reactor vessel temperature (variable 4) and temperature controller output 
(variable 11) as other key variables to detect low quality production. The case study 
demonstrates that process knowledge justifies the selection of the key variables by the 
proposed methodology. 
 
As mentioned in section 3.2, there are other options to group variables. Table 3-5 presents 
the selected group of variables according to different grouping methods. As shown in the 
table, different methods may result in significantly different results.  
 
Table 3-5: Results on group formation using different methodologies 
Groups	   G1	   G2	   G3	   G4	   G5	  
Variable	  type	   1	   2,4,7,9	   3	   5,6,8	   10,11	  
Plant/Unit	   4,2,6,9,11	   1,4	   3,7,8	   1,5,10	   	  	  
Correlation	   2,3,4	   6,9	   7,11	   5,8,10	   1	  
Event	  based	   2,6,11	   1,8,10	   3,4,11	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3.7 Conclusion 
A procedure for selection of variables to form groups for an event-based alarm system is 
detailed. The method uses the information theory and the concept of mutual information 
to select the key variables to allocate to a group. Correlation analyses are then carried out 
to select the redundant variables within a group. A case study using the example of a 
CSTR is used to elaborate the proposed methodology. Following the same procedure, 
variable selection to design an event-based alarm system can be carried out for an entire 
plant. Once variables are selected to form groups, one alarm will be assigned to each 
group. Finally, an event-based approach will be used to estimate the probability of event 
occurrence. The warning will be annunciated if the overall probability is higher than a 
pre-chosen threshold. This chapter outlines the grouping methods; event probability 
estimation and root-cause diagnosis of event warning have been addressed in the next 
chapter.
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4  EARLY WARNING SYSTEM DESIGNING METHODOLOGY 
The proposed early warning system design methodology includes two main elements. 
First, a Bayesian Network (BN) is constructed to define the relationship of each identified 
event with the factors associated with it. Second, the BN is used to calculate the real time 
probability of the event occurrence and to diagnose the root-causes of the event utilizing 
sensor measurements.  
 
Figure 4-1 presents the complete methodology for the early warning system. The 
proposed procedure starts with identifying (a) the significant abnormal events, (b) 
scenarios associated with each event, (c) process measurements (symptoms) related to 
each event and (d) the root-causes of the events. Subsequently, Bayesian networks are 
developed to define the following relationships (i) between process event and scenarios 
(ii) between scenarios and symptoms, and (iii) between symptoms and root-causes. The 
first two relations are used to issue warnings and the third relation is used to identify the 
root causes of a warning. Real time measurements of process variables are used as inputs 
to the warning system. The measured variables are used as evidences to update the 
probabilities of symptom nodes in the Bayesian Network. Next, the probabilities of 
scenarios and event occurrences are assessed using BN forward inference. If the 
probability of an event occurrence exceeds a predefined threshold value, a warning is 
annunciated. When a warning is annunciated, the root-cause analysis is carried out using 
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the evidences. The methodology includes four main steps described in the following 
sections. 
 
Figure 4-1: Event-based early warning system design methodology 
4.1 Step 1: Identification of events and corresponding scenarios and root-causes 
4.1.1 Identification of events 
In the proposed methodology, warnings are assigned to undesirable events instead of 
individual variables. Events, in the context of the proposed warning system, are defined 
as undesirable abnormal conditions such as runaway reaction in a reactor, flooding of a 
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tank or operational problems e.g. plant shutdown or product degradation. Figure 4-2 
presents the propagation of an abnormal event. One or several initial causes such as 
failures can cause deviation of the process variables away from their normal operating 
conditions. The process can further deviate from normal operation range due to failure of 
process safety barriers. Subsequently, an undesirable event can occur.  
 
Figure 4-2: Abnormal event propagation 
 
The first step in the methodology is to identify the undesired events, which can take place 
during the operation of the particular process. There are many risk assessment tools that 
can be used to identify events. In the proposed procedure, the Hazard and Operability 
Study (HAZOP) is used to identify the potential events.  HAZOP study is a qualitative 
risk assessment method to identify process hazards that can occur due to deviations of the 
process variables. Piping and instrumentation diagrams are used to identify the 
propagation of major process variable deviations. The process variables are 
systematically analyzed using the so-called guidewords to identify potential 
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consequences. The root-causes of the corresponding deviations are also identified. Table 
4-1 presents the list of HAZOP guidewords.   
Table 4-1: HAZOP guideword list 
Guidewords	   Meaning	  
NO,	  NOT,	  NONE	   The	  complete	  negation	  of	  the	  intention	  
MORE,	  HIGHER,	  GREATER	   Quantitative	  increase	  	  
LESS,	  LOWER	   Quantitative	  decrease	  	  
AS	  WELL	  AS	   Quantitative	  increase	  	  
PART	  OF	  	   Quantitative	  decrease	  	  
REVERSE	   The	  logical	  opposite	  of	  
OTHER	  THAN	  	   Complete	  substitution	  
SOONER	  THAN	   Too	  early	  or	  in	  the	  wrong	  order	  
WHERE	  ELSE	   In	  additional	  location	  
LATER	  THAN	   Too	  late	  or	  in	  the	  wrong	  order	  
 
After carrying out the study, the significant abnormal conditions that need to be warned in 
the operation are identified as events. For example, in a simple tank process, a deviation 
in the flow rate of the inlet or the outlet stream may lead to over-flow of the tank with 
significant consequences. Hence, the overflow is considered as an event for the tank 
process. Table 4-2 presents the HAZOP table for a buffer tank operation. 
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Table 4-2: Example HAZOP study for tank operation 
	  	   Process	  
variables	  
Deviation	   Consequences	   Causes	  
1	   Level	   High	   1.	  Overflow	  of	  tank	   1.	  High	  inlet	  flow	  	  
2.	  Environment	  hazard	   2.	  Failure	  of	  the	  level	  control	  
system	  
	  	   3.	  Blockage	  in	  outlet	  pipe	  
	  	   4.	  Secondary	  inlet	  valve	  failure	  
Low	   1.	  Possible	  damage	  to	  
Pump	  
1.	  High	  flow	  	  
	  	   2.	  Failure	  of	  the	  level	  control	  
system	  
	  	   3.	  Tank	  leakage	  
2	  
	  
	  
	  
Outlet	  
flow	  
High	   1.	  None	  identified	   1.	  Failure	  of	  the	  level	  control	  
system	  
	  	   2.	  Secondary	  inlet	  valve	  failure	  
Low/No	   1.	  Overflow	  of	  tank	   1.	  Outlet	  valve	  blockage	  
2.	  Environment	  hazard	   	  	  
3	  
	  
	  
	  
Inlet	  flow	   High	   1.	  Overflow	  of	  tank	   1.	  Failure	  of	  the	  level	  control	  
system	  
2.	  Environment	  hazard	   2.	  Pump	  high	  speed	  
Reverse	   1.	  None	  identified	   1.	  Pump	  mechanical	  problem	  
.	  .	  .	   .	  .	  .	   .	  .	  .	   .	  .	  .	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4.1.2 Variable allocation for event-based groups 
After identifying the significant events, monitored process variables are selected 
according to their abilities to distinguish between an abnormal event and a normal 
condition. The deviations of these process variables are defined as the symptoms of the 
event. If the process plant is large and complex or if there is not sufficient expert 
knowledge about the process, data-based variable selection methods are more efficient to 
allocate variables to abnormal event-based groups.  A detailed methodology on allocation 
of variables to event-based groups using mutual information and cross correlation 
analysis has been described in chapter 3. In the proposed early warning design 
methodology, mutual information between an event and a process variable is used to 
select the key variables if the plant is complex. Process knowledge is used for allocation 
of variables for simple processes. 
4.1.3 Identification of corresponding scenarios 
Scenarios are defined as the process operating conditions that influence an event. 
Deviations of process variables and their correlations during an event are considered 
when determining scenarios. Deviation of one variable or combination of different 
variables causes a scenario. For example, saturation of a flow control valve along with an 
increase in the level of liquid in a tank can be considered as one scenario. Both of these 
conditions are needed to occur for this scenario to happen. If the controller valve reaches 
to the saturation limit without level deviation then this condition is controllable and it will 
not influence the overflow event. 
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4.1.4 Identification of corresponding root-causes 
Possible root-causes are identified that can influence the process variables to deviate from 
their respective normal limits and thus the occurrence of an event. These root-causes can 
be external disturbances, equipment malfunctions, control system failures or human 
errors. In this methodology, all the root-causes that are associated with the events are 
identified using the information from the HAZOP study. An alternative to the HAZOP 
study is the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). FMEA identifies the failures in 
process equipment as well as the effect of these failures. In this method, process 
components are considered and the failure modes that can occur during the operation are 
examined. Also, the undesirable effects of each failure are evaluated. Failures, which 
influence the process variable deviation and finally propagate to an event, are considered 
as root-causes of the corresponding event.  
46 
 
 
4.2 Step 2: Development of Bayesian Network (BN) 
After identifying the event and the corresponding scenarios, symptoms and root-causes, 
Bayesian Network is used to develop the event-based early warning system. 
4.2.1 Bayesian Network 
Bayesian Network (BN) is a graphical method that is used to model causal relationship 
among random variables.  BN contains two parts, a graphical structure that defines the 
qualitative representation, and the conditional probabilities that define the quantitative 
relations. The network structure is a directed acyclic graph containing nodes and arcs: 
nodes represent uncertain variables and arcs represent the direct casual relationship or the 
influence between linked nodes (Pearl, 1988; Korb & Nicholson, 2003).  
 
BN represents the joint probability distribution of discrete random variable nodes 𝑋 = (𝑋!,𝑋!,…𝑋!).  According to the chain rule of probability theory, joint probability 𝑃 𝑋! = 𝑥!,𝑋! = 𝑥!,… ,𝑋! = 𝑥!   = 𝑃 𝑥!, 𝑥!,… . . , 𝑥!  is factorized as, 𝑃 𝑥!, 𝑥!,… . . , 𝑥! = 𝑃 𝑥! ∗ 𝑃 𝑥! 𝑥! ∗… .∗ 𝑃 𝑥! 𝑥!, 𝑥!,… . . 𝑥!!!            ( 4-1 )  
According to the d-separation property of BN, root nodes are conditionally independent 
and the rest of the nodes are conditionally dependent with their direct parents.  Hence, the 
joint probability distribution is compacted as, 
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𝑃 𝑥!, 𝑥!,… . . , 𝑥! = 𝑃(𝑥!|𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑋! )!!  ( 4-2 ) 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑋!  are the parent nodes that are directly connected with the node 𝑋! (Korb & 
Nicholson, 2003).  
 
 
Figure 4-3: Bayesian Network example 1 network topology 
Example 1: Figure 4-3 presents a simple Bayesian Network having random variable A, B, 
C, D, and E. Joint probability distribution of the BN can be presented as, 𝑃(𝐴,𝐵,𝐶,𝐷,𝐸)   =   𝑃(𝐸|𝐴,𝐵,𝐶,𝐷)  𝑃(𝐷|𝐴,𝐵,𝐶)  𝑃(𝐶|𝐵,𝐴)  𝑃(𝐵|𝐴)  𝑃(𝐴) 
 
However due to the variable independency that represented in the network, above joint 
probability can compress as,  𝑃(𝐴,𝐵,𝐶,𝐷,𝐸)   =   𝑃(𝐸)  𝑃(𝐷|𝐴)  𝑃(𝐶|𝐵)  𝑃(𝐵|𝐴,𝐸)  𝑃(𝐴) 
In order to quantify the network, conditional probability tables of 𝑃(𝐷|𝐴), 𝑃(𝐶|𝐴), and 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴,𝐸) are required. 
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The most important property of the BN is its ability to perform probabilistic inference. 
Any evidence (𝐸) can be entered into any node and according to the evidence, the belief 
of the other nodes are updated (Khakzad et al., 2011; Korb & Nicholson, 2003). 
𝑃 X|𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝑃(𝑋, 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑃(𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) = 𝑃(𝑋, 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑃(𝑋! , 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)!      ( 4-3 ) 
 
In this methodology, probabilities of the symptoms nodes are updated using real time 
process evidences. According to the symptoms, beliefs about the other nodes probabilities 
are updated. There are two cases of belief updating, first is the forward inference which is 
the prediction of a child node probability using the evidences of parent nodes. The 
forward inference is used to calculate the 𝑃(𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡|𝑆𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑠). Backward inference, 
which diagnoses a parent node probability, using evidences of the child nodes is used to 
calculate the 𝑃(𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠!|𝑆𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑠) using the Bayes theorem (Korb & Nicholson, 
2003). 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Bayesian Network example 2 network topology 
Example 2: Figure 4-4 present a simple Bayesian network about a student getting a 
scholarship.  
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A: Study hard for exam, B: Get high score for exam and C: Get a scholarship.  
Conditional probabilities of the BN:  𝑃 𝐵 = 𝑇 𝐴 = 𝑇 = 0.8, 𝑃 𝐵 = 𝑇 𝐴 = 𝐹 = 0.3   𝑃 𝐶 = 𝑇 𝐵 = 𝑇 = 0.75, 𝑃(𝐶 = 𝑇|𝐵 = 𝐹)   = 0.1 
Case 1: If there is an evidence that probability of student studying hard is 𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑇) =0.7  , then from BN forward inference, the probability of getting a high score is estimated 
as follows, 𝑃 𝐵 = 𝑇,𝐴 = 𝑃 𝐵 = 𝑇 𝐴 = 𝑇 ∗ 𝑃 𝐴 = 𝑇 + 𝑃 𝐵 = 𝑇 𝐴 = 𝐹 ∗ 𝑃 𝐴 = 𝐹= 0.8 ∗ 0.7+ 0.3 ∗ 0.3 = 0.65 
 
Subsequently, probability of student getting a scholarship is estimated as follows,  𝑃 𝐶 = 𝑇,𝐵 =   𝑃 𝐶 = 𝑇 𝐵 = 𝑇 ∗ 𝑃 𝐵 = 𝑇 + 𝑃 𝐶 = 𝑇 𝐵 = 𝐹 ∗ 𝑃 𝐵 = 𝐹   =   0.75 ∗ 0.65+ 0.1 ∗ 0.35 = 0.5225   
Case 2: If there is uncertainty regarding whether the student has studied hard or not, then 
from the history of the student, probability of student studying hard is believed as 𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑇) = 0.4. However, if there is evidence that the student got 80% score, 𝑃(𝐵 = 𝑇) 
can be updated to 0.8.  From the evidence of the exam score, belief about the student has 
studied hard can be updated by BN backward inference as follows,  
𝑃 𝐴 = 𝑇|𝐵 = 𝑇 = 𝑃 𝐴 = 𝑇,𝐵 = 𝑇𝑃 𝐴,𝐵 = 𝑇!!!,!   =   𝜆𝑃 𝐵 = 𝑇 𝐴 = 𝑇 𝑃 𝐴 = 𝑇      
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= 𝜆 ∗ 0.8 ∗ 0.4     =       𝜆0.32                                     
𝑃 𝐴 = 𝐹|𝐵 = 𝑇 = 𝑃 𝐴 = 𝐹,𝐵 = 𝑇𝑃 A,𝐵 = 𝑇!!!,!   =   𝜆𝑃 𝐵 = 𝑇 𝐴 = 𝐹 𝑃 𝐴 = 𝐹      = 𝜆 ∗ 0.3 ∗ 0.6     =       𝜆0.18                                     1 = 𝑃 𝐴 = 𝑇 𝐵 = 𝑇 + 𝑃 𝐴 = 𝐹 𝐵 = 𝑇 = 𝜆0.32+   𝜆0.18 = 𝜆0.5 𝜆 = 2 𝑃 𝐴 = 𝑇 𝐵 = 𝑇 = 0.64 
Similarly 𝑃 𝐴 = 𝑇|𝐵 = 𝐹  is calculated 𝑃 𝐴 = 𝑇|𝐵 = 𝐹 =   0.16 
But with the evidence, 𝑃(𝐵 = 𝑇) = 0.8, we can estimate,  𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑇,𝐵) = 𝑃 𝐴 = 𝑇 𝐵 = 𝑇 ∗ 𝑃 𝐵 = 𝑇 + 𝑃 𝐴 = 𝑇 𝐵 = 𝐹 ∗ 𝑃 𝐵 = 𝐹  = 0.64 ∗ 0.8+ 0.16 ∗ 0.2 = 0.544   
BN forward inference is used to calculate the probability of getting a scholarship as 
follows, 𝑃 𝐶 = 𝑇,𝐵 = 𝑃 𝐶 = 𝑇 𝐵 = 𝑇 ∗ 𝑃 𝐵 = 𝑇 + 𝑃 𝐶 = 𝑇 𝐵 = 𝐹 ∗ 𝑃 𝐵 = 𝐹= 0.75 ∗ 0.8+ 0.1 ∗ 0.2 = 0.62   
According to the evidence, the belief about whether the student has studied hard has 
increased from 0.4 to 0.544 and the likelihood of student getting a scholarship is 
estimated as 0.62. 
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4.2.2 Bayesian Network topology development 
Construction of the BN topology depends on the qualitative relationships among variable 
nodes. The proposed network consists of four different layers of nodes. Root nodes are 
root-causes that influence the deviation of the process variables. First intermediate nodes 
that are influenced by the root-cause nodes are the symptom nodes. Other intermediate 
nodes, which are influenced by symptoms, are the scenario nodes. Finally leaf nodes, 
which do not have any child, are considered as event node. Figure 4-5 presents the BN 
structure for the proposed early warning system.   
 
According to the network in Figure 4-5, joint probability of the event (E) and the 
corresponding scenarios (SC), symptoms (SY) and root-causes (RC) are expressed as 
follows, 
𝑃 E, SC, SY,RC = P E SC 𝑃(SC!|SY)!!!! ∗ 𝑃(SY!|RC)!!!! ∗ 𝑃(RC!)!!!!        ( 4-4 ) 
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Figure 4-5: Bayesian Network topology representing early warning system 
4.2.3 Defining strength of the variables 
The conditional probabilities define the strength of the causal relationships among parent 
nodes and child nodes. The probabilities can be defined based on expert knowledge or 
from historical data using Bayesian learning methods. In this study, expert knowledge is 
used to define the strength of the relationship among nodes due to the unavailability of 
the large number of historical process data on different abnormal events. 
 
The main obstacle in determining the conditional probabilities arises when the number of 
parent variable nodes is large. With the increase in parent nodes, the number of 
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conditional probability requirement increase exponentially. Variable nodes in the 
proposed methodology consider the occurrence and nonoccurrence of respective variable 
node as their states. Hence, the proposed BN has only binary state variable nodes.   
Therefore, if there are n number of parents for a single child, then 2! number of 
parameters are required to define the network strength (Pearl, 1988; Bobbio, Portinale, 
Minichino, & Ciancamerla, 2001; Flairs, Barr, Markov, Zagorecki, & Druzdzel, 2004). 
There can be a large number of parent nodes (root-cause or scenario nodes) that influence 
the child node (symptom or event node). Hence, a large number of conditional parameters 
are needed to define the proposed network. This situation would not be desirable or 
practical for a large industrial plant. In order to reduce the number of parameters, Noisy 
OR is used that simplifies the Bayesian Network (Bobbio et al., 2001; Flairs et al., 2004; 
Khakzad, Khan, Amyotte, & Cozzani, 2012). If there is 𝑛 number of parent nodes directly 
connected to a child node, then the conditional probability parameters that are needed to 
define are reduced from 2! to n when the Noisy OR logic algorithm is used. Noisy OR 
can be used if a variable 𝑌  has binary parent variables 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠(𝑌) = 𝑋!,𝑋!…𝑋!  and 
also if the following two assumptions are true, 
1. Parent node 𝑋!   influences child node 𝑌 independently from other parent nodes. In the 
proposed network, each root-cause nodes and scenario nodes can independently influence 
the symptom nodes and event nodes without occurrence of other respective parent nodes.  
 2. 𝑌 is false if none of the parent is true, 𝑃 𝐸 𝑋!…𝑋! = 0. It is assumed that when 
identifying the root-causes and scenarios, all the possible conditions are identified. Hence, 
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if all the root-causes do not occur, the probability of symptom occurrence is zero and if 
all the scenarios do not occur, the probability of event occurrence is zero. The conditional 
probability of 𝑌  can be calculated as follows,  
 𝑃 𝑌 𝑋 = 1− 1− 𝑝!!!!!    ( 4-5 ) 
Where, 𝜋 is the set of true variables in X and 𝑝! = 𝑃(𝑌|𝑋!,𝑋!,… ,𝑋!!!,𝑋! ,𝑋!!!,…𝑋!) is 
the probability of 𝑌 given 𝑋! is true and all other parents are false (for all i=1 to n) 
(Onisko, Druzdzel, & Wasyluk, 2000; Bobbio et al., 2001). Therefore, Noisy OR is used 
between root-causes and symptoms and between scenarios and event nodes. Only the 
individual influence of parent to its child needs to be defined and the other conditional 
probabilities are calculated using the Noisy OR algorithm. 
 
Example 3: Consider the simple Bayesian Network with binary variables present in 
Figure 4-6 (A: Flue, B: Cold C: Malaria and D: Fever). Each parent nodes can influence 
the child node. In order to complete the conditional probability table for this particular 
BN, 8 conditional probabilities are needed. However, with Noisy OR technique the 
conditional probability requirement can reduce to 3. However, the following assumptions 
should be satisfied, (1) each parent node have to independently influence the child node 
and (2) if all the parent node are false then the child node should be false.  
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Figure 4-6: Bayesian Network example 03 Network topology 
Then only the 3 probabilities that are needed to complete the CPT, 𝑃 𝐷 𝐴,𝐵,𝐶 =0.6;   𝑃 𝐷 𝐴,𝐵,𝐶 = 0.9;   𝑃 𝐷 𝐴,𝐵,𝐶 = 0.98. Table 4-3 presents the calculation of 
conditional probabilities. 
Table 4-3: Bayesian Network conditional probability table for example 3   
Cold	   Flue	   Malaria	   𝑷(𝑭𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓  |  𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒅,𝑭𝒍𝒖𝒆,𝑴𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂)	  
T	   F	   F	   	  	   0.3	  
T	   F	   T	   1-­‐(1-­‐0.3)*(1-­‐0.98)	   0.986	  
T	   T	   F	   1-­‐(1-­‐0.3)*(1-­‐0.9)	   0.93	  
T	   T	   T	   1-­‐(1-­‐0.3)*(1-­‐0.9)*(1-­‐0.98)	   0.9986	  
F	   F	   F	   	  	   0	  
F	   F	   T	   	  	   0.98	  
F	   T	   F	   	  	   0.9	  
F	   T	   T	   1-­‐(1-­‐0.9)*(1-­‐0.98)	   0.998	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4.3 Step 3: Real time probability estimation and alarm annunciation 
4.3.1 Evidence updating from real time sensor measurements 
Evidences can be updated to any node in the Bayesian Network. In the proposed warning 
system model, evidences are the real time sensor measurements. From these evidences, 
probabilities of the symptom nodes are updated. Symptoms are defined as the occurrence 
of the variable deviation to a faulty state. Normal range of a variable is defined by 
statistical process control 3-sigma method or according to the desirable process limits of 
the respective variables. In this study, process variable values between upper control limit 
(UCL) and lower control limit (LCL) are considered as the normal range. Values, which 
fall outside that range, are considered as abnormal. If a variable is at its threshold limit, 
then it can either move back to normal condition or propagate to an abnormal condition; 
hence, the probability of the fault in the process variable is considered as 0.5. Using this 
concept, following equations are proposed by Bao et al. (Bao et al., 2011) to calculate the 
probability of variable deviation to a faulty state. 𝐼𝑓  𝑣! > 𝜇!  
𝑃 𝑣! > 𝑣!" =   𝜑 𝑣! − (𝜇! + 3𝜎!)𝜎! = 12𝜋𝜎! 𝑒(!!! !!!!!!) !!!!!   𝑑𝑣          !!!!   ( 4-6 )  𝐼𝑓  𝑣! < 𝜇! 
𝑃 𝑣! < 𝑣!" =   𝜑 𝑣! − (𝜇! − 3𝜎!)𝜎! = 12𝜋𝜎! 𝑒(!!! !!!!!!) !!!!!       !!!! 𝑑𝑣  ( 4-7 )  
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Figure 4-7: Probability of process variable being faulty 
Where, 𝑣! is the value of the 𝑉! process variable. 𝑣!" and 𝑣!" are the fault thresholds.  
UCL and LCL are considered as 𝜇! − 3𝜎! and 𝜇! + 3𝜎! respectively. 𝜇! is the steady state 
value and 𝜎! is selected according to the faulty limit. Consequently, with the real time 
measured data, probability of each process variable moving to a faulty condition is 
calculated to update the probability of all symptom nodes. 
4.3.2 Real time prediction of event occurrence 
After updating the symptom nodes probabilities using the evidences at each time step, the 
developed Bayesian Network is used to predict the probability of the scenario nodes and 
event nodes using BN forward inference. In order to minimize the false alarm condition, 
noise filtering is carried out using moving average filter for all sensor measurements 
(Izadi, Shah, & Shook, 2009; Smith, 2009).  
𝑥! = 1𝑛 𝑥!!!!! +⋯+ 𝑥!!! + 𝑥! ;                       𝑘 = 𝑛,𝑛 + 1,…        
 
( 4-8 ) 
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Where, n is the number of data points that are considered and 𝑥! is the value of the 
variable 𝑥 at 𝑘th time step. 𝑥! is the moving average value of the data set at 𝑘th time step.  
 
Further, a forecasting step is introduced at the warning annunciation to increase the 
warning system robustness. This step is carried out when the probability of an event 
occurrence exceeds the threshold level. A moving window linear regression is carried out 
to calculate the probabilities of event occurrence for the next 𝑛 time steps as follows, 𝑃 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 !(!!!) = 𝑏 ∗ 𝑡!!! + 𝑎     ( 4-9 ) 
 𝑛 is the number of steps that need to forecast and it is decided considering the maximum 
safety time required for the operator to take corrective action or according to the 
acceptable false warning rate. 𝑖 is the current time step. Following equations are used to 
calculate the 𝑎 and 𝑏 parameters of the equation ( 4-9 ). 
𝑎 = 𝑃 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 !! − 𝑏 𝑡!!!!!!!!! 𝑤                
 
( 4-10 ) 
 
𝑏 = 𝑤 𝑡! ∗ 𝑃 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 !! − 𝑡!!!! ! ∗!!!! 𝑃 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 !!!!!𝑤 𝑡!!!!! ! − 𝑡!!!! ! !        
 
( 4-11 ) 
 
𝑃 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 !! is the probability of event at time 𝑡!. 𝑤 is the window width of the data set. 
The window width can be decided according to the time steps as in Figure 4-8. Once the 
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real time probability of the event occurrence exceeds its threshold limit, forecast 
probability is estimated to annunciate the event warning. If the forecasted probability of 
event occurrence for next 𝑛 time step 𝑃 𝐸𝑣e𝑛𝑡 !!!!  approach to one, warning will 
trigger to inform the operator about the unsafe event condition and if not an alert will be 
issued to inform the vulnerable plant state. In both cases, root-cause diagnosis is carried 
out.  
 
Figure 4-8: Moving window linear regression for forecasting 
4.4 Step 4: Root-cause analysis 
If the event probability exceeds the threshold limit, root-cause diagnosis is carried out 
using the BN backward inference. This is also done using the symptom node probabilities 
that are updated by real time measurements. The following equation is used to update the 
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parent node (root-causes) probabilities, given the child nodes (symptoms) probabilities 
using Bayes Theorem. It is assumed that each root-cause is independent. 𝑃 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒!|𝑆𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑠
= 𝑃 𝑆𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑠 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒! ∗ 𝑃(𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡C𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒!)𝑆𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑠 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒! ∗ 𝑃(𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒!)!"!!,!    
 ( 4-12 ) 
 
 
Example 4: Consider the BN presented in Figure 4-9 that represent the root-causes and 
variable deviations.  
 
Figure 4-9: Bayesian Network example 4 network topology 
It assumes that all the root-causes can influence the symptom variables and conditional 
probabilities are known. Then if the probabilities of each symptom are known from the 
process measurements, the belief about the failures can be update from BN backward 
inference as follows: 
Updating the FA root-cause given process deviations 
𝑃(𝐹𝐴|𝑋!,𝑋!,𝑋!, )   =    𝑃(𝑋!,𝑋!,𝑋!, |𝐹𝐴) ∗ 𝑃(𝐹𝐴)𝑃(𝑋!,𝑋!,𝑋!, |𝐹𝐴) ∗ 𝑃(𝐹𝐴)!"!!,!    =  ∝ 𝑃(𝑋!,𝑋!,𝑋!, |𝐹𝐴) ∗ 𝑃(𝐹𝐴)  , ∝ 𝑖𝑠  𝑎  𝑐o𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡  
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=  ∝ 𝑃 𝐹𝐴 𝑃 𝑋!,𝑋!,𝑋!, 𝐹𝐴,𝐹𝐵! ,𝐹𝐶! 𝑃 𝐹𝐵! 𝑃 𝐹𝐶!!!!,!!!!,!  
  =∝ 𝑃 𝐹𝐴 𝑋𝑖 𝐹𝐴,𝐹𝑏,𝐹𝐶𝑐  𝑖=3 ∗   𝑃 𝐹𝐵𝑏 𝑃 𝐹𝐶𝑐𝑐=𝑇,𝐹𝑏=𝑇,𝐹  
 
Likewise, 𝑃(𝐹𝐴|𝑋!,𝑋!,𝑋!)  is also calculated. Then,  ∝=    1𝑃 𝐹𝐴 𝑋1,𝑋2,𝑋3 +𝑃(𝐹𝐴|𝑋1,𝑋2,𝑋3) 
 
Similarly, 𝑃(𝐹𝐴|𝑋!,𝑋!,𝑋!)  for all True and False of 𝑋!   (i=2,3) combination are 
calculated. Next, diagnostic inference probability of faults FB and FC are calculated for 
all T and F. However, at real time, probability of the variable deviation, 𝑋!(i=1,2,3), are 
uncertain. To calculate the real time root-causes probabilities, the total probability is 
needed to calculate. Following equation present the calculation of FA, 
 𝑃 𝐹𝐴 = 𝑇,𝑋!,𝑋!,𝑋! = .!!!!,! .!!!!,! 𝑃 𝐹𝐴 𝑋!,𝑋!,𝑋!,!!!!,!   𝑃 𝑋! 𝑃 𝑋! 𝑃 𝑋!  
Likewise for faults FB and FC probabilities are calculated. 
 
The proposed methodology is summarized as follows; the abnormal events and the 
associated scenarios, symptoms and root-causes, which can take place during the process 
operation, are identified at the initial step. BN is constructed to represent the relationship 
between the event and associated factors corresponding to the BN topology presented in 
Figure 4-5. The conditional probabilities, that are needed to define the quantitative 
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relationship of the BN, are determined by expert knowledge. In order to minimize the 
number of conditional probabilities, Noisy OR condition is adopted between root-causes 
and symptoms and between scenarios and events using equation 4-5. Real time process 
measurements are used to update the probabilities of the symptoms using 4-6 and 4-7. 
According to the symptoms probabilities, child nodes of the symptom nodes are updated 
by forward inference using equation 4-4 to calculate the probability of event occurrence. 
Consequently, parent nodes of the symptom nodes are updated by backward inference 
using equation 4-12 to calculate the probability of the root-causes. According to the 
threshold level, warning is annunciated and possible root-causes are displayed in the 
warning system. In the next chapter, an experimental application along with a simulation 
study, are used to demonstrate the methodology and evaluate its performance. 
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5  METHODOLOGY TESTING AND APPLICATIONS 
Application of the proposed methodology is demonstrated using two case studies. The 
first study is based on a level control tank process. This experimental setup is used to test 
and validate the concept. The second case study is based on the simulation of a complex 
jacketed Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor (CSTR) system. This case study demonstrates 
the performance of proposed method. 
5.1 Application 1: Level control tank experiment 
 
Figure 5-1: Photograph of the tank level controller set-up 
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Figure 5-2: Diagram of the tank level controller set-up 
The level control set-up in the Process Dynamics and Control Laboratory at the Memorial 
University is used to experimentally demonstrate the methodology. A photograph of the 
tank set-up is presented in Figure 5-1. The instrumentation diagram of the process is 
presented in Figure 5-2.  There are two flow inlets, one is to supply water (Fo) and the 
other is to create disturbance (Fd). The bottom outlet (F) is used to remove water from 
the tank. The inlet flow rate is manipulated using a level controller (LC) (proportional-
integral controller) by adjusting the control valve (V-6) to maintain the required level in 
the tank. Two process variables, the level of liquid in the tank and the percentage opening 
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of the flow control valve, are measured in real time with a sampling interval of 0.5 
second. Data were captured and store from a computer connected to the control system. 
The tank height is 0.6m. At steady state, water level is at 0.3m with the flow control 
valve opening at 50%. 
5.1.1 Identification of event and corresponding scenarios and root-causes 
Table 5-1: HAZOP study for level control tank 
 Variable Deviation Consequences Causes 
1 Level 
High 
Overflow of tank High inlet flow (Disturbance 1) 
  Failure of the level control system 
  Outlet valve blockage (Disturbance 2) 
  Secondary inlet valve failure 
Low 
Pump Damage High outlet flow  
  Failure of the level control system 
  Tank leakage 
2 
Outlet 
flow 
High 
None Failure of the level control system 
  Secondary inlet valve failure 
Low/No 
Overflow of tank Outlet valve blockage (Disturbance 2) 
  Tank leakage 
3 
Inlet 
flow 
High 
Overflow of tank Failure of the level control system 
  Pump problem - high speed 
Reverse None Pump mechanical problem 
Low/No None Pump failure 
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HAZOP study is carried out to identify potential events that can occur during operation 
with the tank. According to the results of the HAZOP study, presented in Table 5-1, a 
significant abnormal event that can occur in the experiment setup is the flooding of the 
tank. Two process variables that are monitored in real-time in this experiment, namely, 
the tank level and the control valve position, are selected to the flooding event group. 
Hence, the valve position deviating to the minimum limit and the level deviating to the 
faulty limit are considered as the symptoms. Two scenarios, which influence the flooding 
event, are high level condition (S1) and controller valve saturation before controlling the 
level increment (S2). Identified root causes are presented in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2: Tank level controller root-causes for flooding event 
 
 
 
 
5.1.2 Development of Bayesian Network  
Figure 5-3 presents the Bayesian Network for the flooding event, which is constructed 
according to the proposed methodology. HHL and HL symptom nodes represent the level 
reaching to the High-High limit and the High limit, respectively. LV represents the valve 
reaching to its minimum opening position. Conditional probabilities are assigned to 
Node	   Root-­‐causes	  
FA	   Disturbance	  inflow/outflow	  
FB	   Flow	  controller	  failure	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define the causal relationships among parent nodes and their child nodes based on 
process knowledge. Noisy OR is used to define relationships between a root-cause and a 
symptom and between a scenario and an event. 
 
Figure 5-3: Tank level controller Bayesian Network  
5.1.3 Real time probability calculation and warning annunciation 
Using equations 4-6 and equation 4-7, the symptom node probabilities are updated using 
the process measurements. Then, according to the symptom nodes probabilities, two 
scenarios are updated by BN forward inference. Finally the flooding event (E) probability 
is updated to check the process condition. Warning is triggered when the flooding 
probability exceeds 0.9 and the forecast flooding probability reaches to 1. Finally, root-
cause nodes probabilities are updated by BN backward inference.   
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5.1.4 Results 
The level is the primary variable to monitor the overflow condition. The secondary 
variable, level controller opening percentage also gives information about the overflow 
condition. However, in conventional alarm system, most secondary process variables are 
considered as nuisance alarms when detecting abnormal events and only deviations of 
primary variables are considered.  Thus, the variable-based High-High (HH) level alarm, 
which triggers to inform that the water level has exceeded the overflow limit, is defined 
as the conventional alarm. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method, its 
performance is compared with the HH level alarm. Figure 5-4 presents the performance 
of the conventional level alarm and the event-based early warning system for disturbance 
in the inlet flow. With this disturbance, the level increases steadily and the control valve 
moves toward its minimum position to bring the level back to the set point. Unlike the 
conventional method, the proposed method considers both the level and the valve 
position to estimate the probability of occurrence of flooding. When the valve opening 
reached to its minimum position, the certainty of the flooding event occurrence increases. 
In this situation, there is no more control action available to prevent the level increase. 
The proposed warning system triggered before the conventional level alarm. In this case, 
conventional level alarm triggers at 20.5s and the proposed warning system triggers at 
18s.  Flooding occurs at 24s, therefore, correction time has increase by 71.4%. . Time 
saving % represents the percentage increase in operator’s correction time with the 
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proposed method with reference to conventional alarm. Time saving % is calculated as 
follows,  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑  𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑜𝑐c𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 − 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 ∗ 100   
 
Numerator of the equation considered the time difference between the proposed and 
conventional system annunciation.  Denominator of the equation considers the correction 
time that the operator has if the conventional alarm system is used. If the numerator 
increases, the saving from the proposed warring will also increase, as the denominator is 
a constant.  
 
Figure 5-4: Real time alarm annunciation for tank Inlet flow disturbance 
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Disturbances and failures are introduced to the experimental setup to analyze the early 
warning capability and root-cause diagnosis ability of the proposed method. Table 5-3 
presents a comparison between the conventional variable-based level alarm and the 
proposed warning system.   
 
For failure of the level controller, there was no time saving as the proposed warning 
system acts similar to the conventional alarm. The reason for this is that both alarms 
consider only the level variable to trigger the alarm. With disturbances in the inflow and 
the outflow, both level and controller action measurements have deviated from the 
normal range. Hence, the proposed method was able to detect the event condition earlier 
than the conventional alarm as it utilized both sensor measurements to calculate the 
probability of the flooding occurrence. 
Table 5-3: Tank level controller time-savings 
Root-­‐causes	   Time	  of	  level	  
alarm	  (s)	  
Time	  of	  
proposed	  
warning	  (s)	  
Time	  of	  event	  
occurrence	  (s)	  
Time	  saving	  
%	  
Level	  controller	  failure	   16.5	   16.5	   19	   -­‐	  
Disturbance	  inflow	   20.5	   18	   24	   71.4	  
Disturbance	  outflow	   9	   7	   12	   66.6	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After the warning was annunciated, proposed method was able to diagnose the root-cause 
correctly. Figure 5-5 presents the result from the root-cause analysis in the case of 
disturbance (FA). 
 
 
Figure 5-5: Tank level controller root-cause analysis for case of disturbance  
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5.2 Application 2: CSTR model simulation 
In the next case study, a simulation based jacketed Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor 
(CSTR) is considered. The instrumentation diagram for the CSTR operation is presented 
in Figure 5-6.   
 
 
Figure 5-6: CSTR plant and controllers 
An irreversible exothermic reaction A→ B is assumed to take place in the reactor with a 
first order kinetics. A temperature controller (TC) is used to control the reactor 
temperature by manipulating the coolant flow valve (V-3). Level controller (LC) 
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maintained the level of the reactor. Reactor outlet valve (V-2) is manipulated to vary the 
reactor outlet flow rate (F). Heat losses are considered negligible and a perfect mixing 
condition is assumed. All parameters for the model are taken from literature (Luyben, 
1996). Following are the ordinary differential equations and the respective parameters for 
the CSTR plant, 𝑑𝑉𝑑𝑡 = 𝐹𝑜 − 𝐹 𝑑(𝑉𝐶𝑎)𝑑𝑡 = 𝐹𝑜𝐶𝑎𝑜 − 𝐹𝐶𝑎 − 𝑉𝑘𝐶𝑎 𝑑(𝑉𝑇)𝑑𝑡 = 𝐹𝑜𝑇𝑜 − 𝐹𝑇 − 𝜆𝑉𝑘𝐶𝑎𝜌𝐶! − 𝑈𝐴!𝜌𝐶! (𝑇 − 𝑇𝐽) 𝑑(𝑇𝐽)𝑑𝑡 = 𝐹𝐽(𝑇𝐽𝑜 − 𝑇𝐽)𝑉! − 𝑈𝐴!𝜌!𝑉!𝐶! (𝑇 − 𝑇𝐽) 𝑘 = 𝛼𝑒!!/!"    
Table 5-4: CSTR model parameters 
Steady state values 𝐹 40 𝑓𝑡!/ℎ 𝑉 48 𝑓𝑡! 𝐶𝑎𝑜 0.5 𝑙𝑏.𝑚𝑜𝑙  /𝑓𝑡! 𝐶𝑎 0.245 𝑙𝑏.𝑚𝑜𝑙  /𝑓𝑡! 𝑇 600 𝑅 𝑇𝐽 549.9 𝑅 𝐹𝐽 49.9 𝑓𝑡!/ℎ 𝑇𝑜 530 𝑅 
Parameter values 𝑉! 3.85 𝑓𝑡! 𝛼 7.08*1010 ℎ!!   𝐸 30000 𝐵𝑡𝑢/𝑙𝑏.𝑚𝑜𝑙 𝑅 1.99 𝐵𝑡𝑢/𝑙𝑏.𝑚𝑜𝑙.𝑅 𝑈 150 𝐵𝑡𝑢/ℎ. 𝑓𝑡!𝑅 𝐴! 250 𝐹𝑡! 
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𝑇𝐽𝑜 530 𝑅 𝜆 -30000 𝐵𝑡𝑢/𝑙𝑏.𝑚𝑜𝑙 𝐶! 0.75 𝐵𝑡𝑢/𝑙𝑏!𝑅 𝐶! 1 𝐵𝑡𝑢/𝑙𝑏.𝑅 𝜌 50 𝑙𝑏!/𝑓𝑡! 𝜌! 62.3 𝐹𝐽 𝐾 4 (𝐹𝑡!/ℎ  )/𝑅    
 
To demonstrate the methodology, the Matlab software is used to build a plant model. 
Simulink model is presented in the appendix. Different root-causes are simulated to 
generate data. Ten variables that are listed in Table 5-5 are measured in real time with a 
sampling time of 1 second. Concentrations of the reactants are not measured. At steady 
state, temperature of the reactor is at 60 0C and the level is at 3.81ft. The corresponding 
temperature control valve position is at 25% and level control valve position is at 50%.  
Table 5-5: Measuring variables in CSTR 
Variable	   Description	  
T	   Temperature	  of	  the	  reactor	  
L	   Level	  of	  the	  reactor	  
To	   Temperature	  of	  reactant	  inflow	  
Fo	   Flow	  rate	  of	  reactant	  inflow	  
TJo	   Temperature	  of	  coolant	  inflow	  
FJo	   Coolant	  flow	  rate	  
F	   Flow	  rate	  of	  reactant	  outflow	  
TJ	   Temperature	  of	  coolant	  outflow	  
TV	   Temperature	  control	  valve	  position	  
LV	   Level	  control	  valve	  position	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5.2.1 Identification of event and corresponding scenarios and root-causes 
According to the HAZOP study, the runaway reaction and the overflow (flooding) 
condition are selected as significant abnormal events that are needed to monitor in real 
time. So the warning system consists of (i) runaway reaction warning and (ii) flooding 
warning. The mutual information between the event and the process variables are 
calculated to identify the key variables that have high information about each event. 
Details about the variable allocation methodology and the results on grouping process 
variable for both the runaway event and the flooding event for the CSTR simulation have 
been discussed in Chapter 3 and can also be found in Dalpatadu et al. (Dalpatadu, 
Ahmed, & Khan, 2013). Five key variables (T, FJo, TJo, TV and TJ) are selected for the 
runaway event group and 4 variables (L, F, Fo, LV) are selected for the flooding event 
group. From the grouped process variables, 5 scenarios are identified that influence the 
runaway event and 5 scenarios are identified for the flooding event. Scenarios 
corresponding to the runaway event are presented in Table 5-6. 
Table 5-6: Scenarios corresponding to runaway event of CSTR 
Node	   Scenario	  
S1	   Reactor	  temperature	  reaching	  to	  the	  runaway	  temperature	  limit	  
S2	   Temperature	  controller	  saturation	  at	  reactor	  high	  temperature	  
S3	   Coolant	  flow	  rate	  decreasing	  at	  reactor	  high	  temperature	  
S4	   Coolant	  temperature	  rise	  up	  at	  reactor	  high	  temperature	  	  
S5	   Coolant	  outflow	  temperature	  rise	  up	  without	  reactor	  temperature	  increment	  
 
76 
 
 
Table 5-7 presents the identified root-causes that can influence the process variables to 
deviate from the respective normal operating range to cause the runaway event. 
 Table 5-7: Root-causes for CSTR runaway condition 
 
5.2.2 Development of Bayesian Network  
According to the methodology presented in section 4.2.2, the BN topology is developed 
for both of the events. Figure 5-7 presents the BN structure for the runaway event. 
Symptom nodes, HHT and HT, represent the temperature reaching to the High-High limit 
and the High limit, respectively. Other symptom nodes represent the corresponding 
measured values reaching to respective limits. Event node, E1, is the runaway occurrence 
node. All the conditional probabilities are assigned based on process knowledge. Noisy 
OR is used to define the conditional probabilities between root-cause and symptom nodes 
and between scenario and event nodes. The use of the Noisy OR reduces the number of 
conditional probabilities from 192 to 30 between root-causes and symptoms, and from 32 
to 5 between scenarios and the runaway event. 
Node	   Root-­‐causes	  
FA	   Temperature	  controller	  failure	  
FB	   Temperature	  sensor	  failure	  
FC	   Coolant	  pump	  failure	  
FD	   Cooling	  towers	  failure	  
FE	   Feed	  mixture	  failure	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Figure 5-7: Bayesian Network topology for CSTR runaway event  
5.2.3 Real time probability calculation and warning annunciation 
Noisy process data from the CSTR model are send through a moving average filter to 
reduce the effect of measurement noise. Then, the filtered process data are used to 
calculate the probability of deviation of the process variables from their corresponding 
steady state to the faulty limit. These probabilities are used as the evidences in the 
Bayesian Network to update the symptom nodes. Scenario nodes and event nodes 
probabilities are calculated using BN forward inference. Root-cause nodes are updated 
using BN backward inference at each time step. If the probability of an event exceeds 0.9 
and the forecasted probability reaches 1, then, the proposed warning system will 
annunciate a warning.   
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5.2.4 Results 
Performances of the conventional alarm and the proposed method are compared to 
demonstrate the advantages of the proposed algorithm. Temperature is the primary 
process variable to monitor the runaway reaction. Hence, conventional variable-based 
alarm refers to the High-High temperature alarm that informs the operator about a high 
temperature state. Conventional alarm triggers when reactor temperature exceeds 74.5 0C. 
Different root-causes can cause the plant state to move from a steady state to an 
undesirable event state. Different root-causes are introduced to the simulated CSTR 
model to analyze the proposed warning system’s capability of early warning and root-
cause diagnosis. In Figure 5-8, the first plot presents the performance of variable-based 
temperature alarm and the second plot presents the event-based early warning for the 
runaway event. In this case, failure in the cooling tower is considered. With the cooling 
tower failure, temperature of the inlet coolant increases and it reduces the heat removal 
ability of the cooling jacket. Therefore, reactor temperature rises from its steady state 
value and subsequently leads to a runaway reaction. Conventional temperature alarm was 
able to detect High-High temperature at 38min. The proposed method was able to detect 
the runaway event at 34 min, which saved 4 min. This is a significant saving as the 
reactor reached to runaway condition at 44 min. Operator’s correction time has increased 
by 66.6% with the proposed method. Also, the variable-based alarm system issued four-
alarms that are T, Tjo, TJ and VT, in which T is the primary variable and others are 
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secondary variables. But proposed warning system annunciates only one event alarm. 
Root-cause is diagnosed correctly by the proposed system.  
  
Figure 5-8: Probability of event occurrence prediction for cooling tower failure 
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Table 5-8 presents the time saving for five different root-causes. In the case of controller 
failure, there is no saving, as in this case only the temperature is used as a variable for 
annunciation of warning.  In the case of sensor failure, temperature alarm cannot detect 
the runaway condition. However, the proposed method detects the situation by utilizing 
other variables. Considerable time saving was achieved. 
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Table 5-8: CSTR runaway event time-savings for different root-causes 
Root-­‐causes	   Time	  of	  
temperature	  
alarm	  (min)	  
Time	  of	  
proposed	  
warning	  (min)	  
Time	  of	  event	  
occurrence	  	  
(min)	  
Time	  
saving	  
%	  
Temp	  controller	  failure	   10	   10	   15	   0	  
Temp	  sensor	  failure	   n/a	   36	   44	   n/a	  
Coolant	  pump	  failure	   31	   28	   35	   75	  
Cooling	  towers	  failure	   38	   34	   44	   66.6	  
Feeding	  operate	  failure	   40	   37.5	   44	   62.5	  
 
The proposed warning system is capable of diagnosing each root-cause accurately. Figure 
5-9 presents the diagnosis of feeding system failure, which led to an increase in the 
reactant inflow concentration. The first plot presents the probability of the runaway event 
occurrence. The second plot presents root-cause diagnosis probability. From BN 
backward inference, proposed method detects that the failure has occurred in the feed 
mixture (FE).  
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Figure 5-9: Root-cause diagnosis-feed controller failure 
5.3 Discussion 
The unique feature of the proposed method is to provide early warning of an abnormal 
event in real time. Conventional variable-based alarm system depends on the deviation of 
the primary variables to detect major abnormal conditions. Operators do not try to assess 
the relationship of the secondary variables with the primary variables. Therefore, the 
early warning capability of the variable-based alarm system is limited. The proposed 
warning system utilizes multiple process measurements to detect an abnormal event. 
Hence, this method showed significant early warning capability compared with the 
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conventional variable-based alarm system in both experimental and simulation studies for 
different root-causes. 
 
Since Bayesian Network is used to develop a model to define the relationship of 
abnormal events and the corresponding factors, development of the network topology and 
defining conditional probabilities are critical steps. Methodology has been proposed to 
define a generic structure for Bayesian Network topology. Using the methodology 
development of the structure for both the CSTR and the tank process for different 
abnormal events was very efficient. Conditional probability requirement for the tank 
process is very low as it is a very simple process with two process measurements. 
However, CSTR is a complex process and the BN contain many child nodes, which are 
influenced by many parent nodes. Hence the number of conditional probability 
requirement is very high. With the Noisy OR algorithm, requirement of conditional 
probabilities reduced significantly. Therefore the Noisy OR is very useful when defining 
conditional probabilities for the CSTR process.  
 
Other unique feature of the proposed warning system is its ability to detect abnormal 
events in case of a failure of the primary variable sensor. Plant operators tend to give 
more attention for primary process variables than the secondary process variables. Also if 
the primary variables are not deviating beyond their threshold limits, operators may 
ignore the other variables. However, if the primary variable sensor fails, then the operator 
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will not be able to diagnose the real situation and may perform wrong corrective action. 
However, the proposed method utilizes the process information of both the primary and 
the secondary variables. Hence, in the CSRT simulation case study, for both runway and 
flooding event, the proposed warning system was able to detect the abnormal event even 
when the primary process variable sensor failed.  
 
Another advantage of the proposed system is its ability to perform root-cause analysis 
using real time sensor data. For both case studies, the root caused analysis algorithm 
correctly identified the main causes of the deviations. This feature is very useful if the 
process plant is very complex or the operators have limited knowledge about the process 
and the abnormal conditions. 
 
In the conventional variable-based alarm system, several alarms are triggered to inform 
the same plant state. With the proposed warning system, only one warning is triggered for 
an event. For example, cooling tower failure in the CSTR case study triggered four 
process alarms in the conventional alarm system. The proposed method reduced four 
variable-based alarms to one event alarm without compromising the ability to perform a 
root-cause analysis. Thus this warning system can be used as an alarm reduction method 
to reduce alarm flooding. Also a minor disturbance, with less influence to lead the plant 
to an abnormal event, may trigger many secondary process variable alarms. However, 
these nuisance alarms can be reduced with the proposed methodology.  
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6  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This thesis proposes a methodology to design an event-based early warning system as an 
alternative to the current alarm systems used in plant operations. Warnings are issued 
based on the estimated probability of an event. Bayesian Network is used to define the 
relationship between an abnormal event and corresponding symptoms, scenarios, and 
root-causes to calculate the probability of an event occurrence. The same network is also 
used to diagnose the root-causes of the event.  An experimental case study using a tank 
level process was carried out to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed method. 
Simulation study using the model of a continuous stirred tank reactor (CSTR) was carried 
out to demonstrate the performance of the algorithm. 
 
• The developed event-based early warning system shows significant early warning 
capabilities compared with the conventional variable-based alarm system when 
detecting abnormal events.  
• This method has the capability to identify the root-causes of an event using real 
time sensor measurements. 
•  The presented study has shown that Bayesian Network can be easily adopted to 
design the early warning system using the proposed generic network structure and 
using the Noisy OR algorithm. 
• By assigning warnings to events, the methodology will result in significantly 
lower number of alarms compared to the variable-based alarm system during an 
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abnormal condition. Thus the proposed warning system can be used as an alarm 
reduction method to reduce alarm flooding. 
6.1 Future work 
The proposed method could be extended to a risk-based warning system by calculating 
the real time risk involved in the process operation. If there are two or more event 
conditions propagating in a process, an appropriate way to prioritize the event warnings 
will be by calculating the individual risk of each event in real time conditions. Risk-based 
approach is more effective in process alarm management. 
 
In order to calculate the risk, the methodology to estimate the probability of events should 
be integrated with algorithms to evaluate the consequences of events.. Each abnormal 
event has different magnitude of severity. Hence a methodology is needed to calculate the 
severity in real time. Deviation of process variable related to each event can be integrated 
to develop such a methodology. 
 
The main concern of this study was the false alarm reduction. In order to minimize false 
alarms, this research has proposed noise filtration and moving window linear regression. 
However it is required to investigate other methods that can be integrated with this 
methodology to reduce false alarms. 
 
In the proposed methodology, expert knowledge is used to define the conditional 
probabilities of the Bayesian Network. However, if it is possible to acquire enough 
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historical data, which are classified according to different abnormal events, Bayesian 
network learning algorithm can be used to learn the conditional probabilities of the 
network. 
 
Finally, it is important to test this methodology with a real complex process system to 
identify further limitation.  
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8  APPENDIX  
APPENDIX A: Variable allocation for event-base group  
1.	  Mathlab/Simulink	  model	  of	  the	  CSTR	  plant	  
 
Figure 10: CSTR Matllab/Simulink model 
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Figure 11: CSTR simulation model: subsystem - reactor 
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2. Mutual information gain results of each abnormla event 
 
Figure 8-12: Mutual information gain between runaway event and each process variable 
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Figure 8-13: Mutual information gain between low quality operation event and each process variable 
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Figure 8-14: Mutual information gain between flooding event and each process variable 
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3. Cross correlation analysis results for each abnormal event 
 
Figure 8-15: Correlation distance between variable at runaway event 
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Figure 8-16: Correlation distance between variable at low quality operation event 
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Figure 8-17: Correlation distance between variable at low flooding event 
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APPENDIX B: Early warning system designing  
4. Tank level control process: Bayesian Network  conditional probabiilty tables 
 
 
Figure 8-18:  Conditional probability tables of tank level control operation 
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 5. Tank level control process: Alarm annunciation result for different root causes 
 
Figure 8-19: Warning annunciation of the inlet flow valve failure (High inlet flow rate) 
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Figure 8-20: Warning annunciation of outlet flow valve failure (Low outlet flow rate) 
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Figure 8-21: Warning annunciation of the level controller failure 
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6. Tank level control process: Root cause analysis 
 
 
Figure 8-22: Root-cause analysis for disturbance 
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Figure 8-23: Root-cause analysis for level controller failure 
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7. CSTR HAZOP study table 
Table 8-1: HAZOP study for CSTR  
Variable Deviation Consequences Causes 
1 FJ No Runaway reaction Temperature controller failure 
Off quality product Temperature sensor failure 
  Plug pipe line 
Reverse Runaway reaction Backflow due to high back pressure 
Off quality product  Coolant pump failure 
More Off quality product Temperature controller failure 
   Coolant pump failure 
As well as None Contamination of water supply 
Low Runaway reaction Temperature controller failure 
  Partially plug line 
  Temperature sensor failure 
  Cooling pump failure 
2 TJo High Runway reaction Cooling tower failure 
3 Cao High Runaway reaction Feeder mixture system failure 
Off quality product Feed flow controller failure 
Low Off quality product Feeder mixture system failure 
4 To High High reactor temperature Feed heater failure 
5 T High Runaway reaction Temperature controller failure 
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Low Off quality product Temperature sensor failure 
6 L High Overflow of reactor Feeding pump failure 
  Failure of the level control system 
  Outlet valve blockage  
  Level sensor failure 
Low None identified High outlet flow  
  Failure of the level control system 
  Tank leakage 
7 F High None identified Level controller failure 
  Level sensor failure 
Low/No Overflow of reactor Outlet valve blockage  
  Level controller failure 
  Level sensor failure 
  Tank leakage 
8 Fo High Overflow of reactor Feed flow controller failure 
Reverse None identified Pump mechanical problem 
Low/No None identified Pump failure 
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8. Complete	  event-­‐based	  warning	  system	  for	  the	  CSTR	  operation	  	  
	  
 
 
Figure 8-24: Runaway and flooding event network for CSTR operation 
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9. CSTR runaway event conditional tables 
Table 8-2 : Runaway Event - Individual inference of root-causes to symptoms 
  FA FB FC FD FE 
HHT 0.95 0.005 0.95 0.95 0.95 
HT 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.99 0.99 
TV 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.99 0.99 
FJ 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.01 
TJo 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.01 
TJ 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.01 
 
Table 8-3: Runaway event - CPT between symptoms and scenarios 
HHT S1 
 
HT TV S2 
 
HT FJ S3 
1 1 
 
1 1 1 
 
1 1 1 
0 0 
 
1 0 0 
 
1 0 0 
   
0 1 0 
 
0 1 0 
   
0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
          HT TJo S4 
 
HHT TJ S5 
   1 1 1 
 
1 1 0 
   1 0 0 
 
1 0 0 
   0 1 0 
 
0 1 1 
   0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
    
Table 8-4: Runaway Event- Individual inference of scenario nodes and event node 
  S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
E 1 0.7 0.5 0.5 1 
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Table 8-5: Conditional probability table of scenarios and event for runaway event 
P(E=1 | S5, S4, S3, S2,S1) = P(g,h,I,j,k,1) 
P(:,:,1,1,1,1) = 
    0.9993    0.9987 
    0.9992    0.9985 
P(:,:,2,1,1,1) = 
    0.9987    0.9973 
    0.9985    0.9970 
P(:,:,1,2,1,1) = 
    0.9978    0.9955 
    0.9975    0.9950 
P(:,:,2,2,1,1) = 
    0.9955    0.9910 
    0.9950    0.9900 
P(:,:,1,1,2,1) = 
    0.9325    0.8650 
    0.9250    0.8500 
P(:,:,2,1,2,1) = 
    0.8650    0.7300 
    0.8500    0.7000 
 
P(:,:,1,1,2,2) = 
    0.0675    0.1350 
    0.0750    0.1500 
P(:,:,2,1,2,2) = 
    0.1350    0.2700 
    0.1500    0.3000 
P(:,:,1,2,2,1) = 
    0.7750    0.5500 
    0.7500    0.5000 
P(:,:,2,2,2,1) = 
    0.5500    0.1000 
    0.5000         0 
P(:,:,1,1,1,2) = 
    0.0007    0.0014 
    0.0008    0.0015 
P(:,:,2,1,1,2) = 
    0.0014    0.0027 
    0.0015    0.0030 
P(:,:,1,2,1,2) = 
    0.0023    0.0045 
    0.0025    0.0050 
P(:,:,2,2,1,2) = 
    0.0045    0.0090 
    0.0050    0.0100 
 
P(:,:,1,2,2,2) = 
    0.2250    0.4500 
    0.2500    0.5000 
P(:,:,2,2,2,2) = 
    0.4500    0.9000 
    0.5000    1.0000 
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10. CSTR runaway event probability calculation and warning annunciation  
 
 
Figure 8-25: Warning annunciation for temperature sensor failure 
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Figure 8-26: Warning annunciation for temperature controller failure 
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Figure 8-27: Warning annunciation for cooling tower failure 
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Figure 8-28: Warning annunciation for coolant pump failure 
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Figure 8-29: Warning annunciation reactant feeding mixture failure 
 
  
 
11. CSTR runaway event root-cause analysis  
 
Figure 8-30: Temperature sensor failure root-cause analysis 
  
 
Figure 8-31: Temperature controller failure root-cause analysis 
  
 
Figure 8-32: Cooling tower failure root-cause analysis 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 8-33: Coolant pump failure root-cause analysis 
 
 
  
 
Figure 8-34: Reactant feeding system failure root-cause analysis 
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